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In November of 2011, the United States Navy Submarine Force conducted a 
revolutionary forum to leverage the technological abilities of the millennial generation in 
order to further the situational awareness of the sailors in the submarine’s control room. 
To facilitate this effort, a design firm was contracted to help understand the needs of the 
community and to guide the design sessions of the junior officers and enlisted brought in 
to generate ideas. The result of the forum was an output of several encouraging new 
methods for displaying information to understand a submarine’s contact much more 
rapidly. These new displays also dramatically reduce the time required to train new 
sailors in their operation.   
This incident provided an excellent opportunity to investigate the interactions of 
the Navy, change management and design thinking in the field of information 
technology. Given the high rate of failure for information technology projects within the 
Department of Defense, design thinking and change management are examined in this 
thesis to find possible methods to reduce the losses created by those failures. 
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This thesis utilizes the case study method to capture the events leading up to, 
during and following the Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG) 
Forum. TANG is an innovative change effort within the United States Navy’s submarine 
force. The submarine community utilized design thinking with the assistance of an 
external trusted agent to leverage the innate technological awareness of its junior sailors 
and officers. This research focuses on the implementation of design thinking and change 
management within the case by capturing the interpersonal interactions of the primary 
actors in support of and resistant to the TANG effort.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The 2000 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software 
stated, “The success and failure rate of DoD and commercial systems appears to be 
equivalent… data regarding performance is difficult to obtain. However, studies 
reveal appalling performance in both environments.”1 The most common source utilized 
for these comments is the Standish Group’s Chaos Study. These reports group all 
investigated information Technology (IT) initiatives, whether government or corporate, 
into one of three categories: successful, challenged, or failed. “Successful” means that the 
project was completed on schedule and on budget as compared to the initial estimate of 
the two metrics.  “Challenged,” means that the project did not meet one or both of the 
metrics,. A “failed” project is defined as one that was cancelled.2  Table 1 represents the 
results of the Standish Group’s reports since 1994. 
                                                 
1 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software. 
Federal Report, Washington D.C.: Office for the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, 2000. 
2 J. Laurenz Eveleens and Chris Verhoef, "The Rise and Fall of the Chaos Report Figures." IEEE 




Table 1.   A History of IT Investment Performance. After J. Laurenz Eveleens and 
Chris Verhoef, “The Rise and Fall of the Chaos Report Figures,”  
A similar report produced by the Hackett Group showed that approximately 40 
percent of IT initiatives are completed either on budget or on schedule. The Hackett 
Group’s findings failed to discriminate between the metrics of schedule and budget. Due 
to this binning of statistics and gap in granularity, those IT initiatives that failed outright 
can be safely assumed to have missed both schedule and budget targets. Absent the raw 
data, however, the report offers no way to discern which IT initiatives included in the 
study failed to meet one or both of the targets of schedule and budget.3   
The fiscal year (FY) 2008 enacted budget for IT was roughly $68 billion4. A 
FY08 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report stated that over $28 billion of those 
IT investments were “poorly planned” and / or “poorly performing.”  The GAO report 
also stated that 100 percent of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) “major IT projects,” 
which totaled over $9.6 billion, were found to be “at risk,” defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget as “projects requiring attention from oversight authorities and 
                                                 
3 The Hackett Group, "IT Projects Delivered Late and Over Budget." Internal Auditor, (Oct 1998). 
4 Office of Management and Budget, "Fiscal Year 2009 Information Technology Budget." The White 
House. April 15, 2009. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/FY09_IT_Budget_Rollout_AprilUpda
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the highest level of agency management.”5  These facts represent a significant threat to 
nearly one-third of the DoD’s IT budget for the fiscal year. 
The budget for FY 2012 provided roughly $80 billion for federal IT spending.6 
Included in this spending was slightly over $37 billion slated for the DoD.7  For FY 
2013, the President has requested just under $79 billion for the federal government IT 
budget, which again included $37 billion for the DoD’s IT programs.8  
Given the constraints of the current fiscal environment, these numbers paint a 
very troubling picture for the Federal Government. When one considers that 40 percent of 
federal IT programs are considered to be “at risk,” in FY 2012 that translates to $32 
billion of taxpayer dollars being at risk. Since 100 percent of the DoD’s major IT 
programs are considered to be at risk, the DoD is responsible for the risk to $11 billion of 
the taxpayer’s money in both FY2012 and FY2013.   
These distressing numbers were a primary catalyst for this researcher’s interest in 
this thesis project. This research was originally intended to create a change management 
plan for the introduction of cloud computing into the Department of Defense. The 
foundation of that thesis was to have been a review of scholarly lessons learned gathered 
from the implementation of the Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) and an analysis of 
their applicability to Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) cloud computing 
                                                 
5 United States Government Accountability Office, “GAO.gov”. 
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/agency/omb/better_it.php (accessed September 23, 2012), and United States 
Government Accountability Office, “OMB and Agencies Need to Improve Planning, Management, and 
Oversight of Projects Totaling Billions of Dollars. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Federal 
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2008. 
6 Vivek Kundra, "Vivek Kundra - FY 2012 Information Technology Budget." The American Council 
for Technology (ACT) - Industry Advisory Council (IAC). 
http://www.actgov.org/knowledgebank/governmentit/Documents/Vivek%20Kundra%20-
%20FY%202012%20Information%20Technology%20Budget%2002%2024%2011.pdf (accessed 
September 6, 2012). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Steven VanRoekel, "FY 2013 IT Budget Overview." The American Council for Technology (ACT) - 
Industry Advisory Council (IAC). 
http://www.actgov.org/knowledgebank/governmentit/Documents/FY2013-
IT%20Budget%20Overview%2002-13-12.pdf (accessed September 6, 2012). 
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initiative. While conducting research for that area of interest, it was discovered that there 
is an alarming lack of recorded corporate knowledge regarding information technology 
change implementations in the DoD. With regards to NMCI, there were only four theses 
from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) that touched on the progress and handling of 
its implementation. Of those four, only Gregory Taylor’s 2006 thesis was focused on 
capturing lessons learned from NMCI.9  External to NPS, a September 2007 case study 
was created at the request of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Forces Transformation and Resources.   
While both of these documents were exceptionally well researched and written, 
this did not represent the volume of background that this researcher had expected to 
discover regarding the expenditure of billions of dollars on the second largest Internet in 
existence. It was surprising to this researcher that an investment costing $8.8 billion over 
the initial seven years of the system, and that encountered so many well-known obstacles, 
including delayed fielding and an inaccurate estimation of the number of applications in 
use by Navy installations, would be so minimally researched.10  In an effort to expand the 
basis for comparison, the research was then broadened to encompass any IT related 
change effort within the DoD or the federal government. This research did not reveal any 
great depth in the recorded knowledge of DoD IT endeavors. 
In an effort to develop guidance on the matter, this researcher met with a retired 
Navy Captain that is a current faculty member at NPS. During the discussion, the 
accounting of numerous IT implementation efforts, their issues and the lessons learned 
continued for nearly an hour. Over the next couple of weeks, this pattern repeated itself. 
This discussion highlighted the abundance of corporate knowledge retained by those who 
have managed or otherwise experienced IT initiatives within the DoD. It also served to 
                                                 
9 Gregory S. Taylor, “NMCI: History, Implementation and Change” (master's thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006). 
10 Kenneth L Jordan, “The NMCI Experience and Lessons Learned: The Consolidation of Networks 
by Outsourcing” Case Study, Washington D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Forces 
Transformation and Resources, 2007. 
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highlight the complete lack of any scholarly recording of the events for future use and 
analysis. 
Contemporary to this realization, a meeting between an executive at the design 
firm IDEO, David Haygood, and Professor Frank Barrett of the Naval Postgraduate 
School brought to light a current and ongoing IT (information display) effort utilizing 
design thinking within the U.S. Navy’s submarine community. Given the opportunity and 
the timing, a decision was made to conduct case study method research into TANG. 
TANG presents a particularly innovative, large-scale change effort that is unusual in that 
it includes input from junior officers and enlisted. It is also an IT driven change that 
includes implementation of various novel technologies in the Undersea Community. This 
thesis will explore the lessons that DoD can glean from large scale, participative change 
in the adoption of new technology.   
While it is not practical to capture the intricacies of every IT related effort within 
the bounds of the DoD, it should be of great benefit to IT managers and the U.S. 
taxpayers if cases from the services that highlight issues encountered during attempts to 
innovate were recorded and analyzed. Potentially, the creation of Harvard Business 
School (HBS) style case studies for use at NPS and other IT decision-maker forums could 
solve both the problem with capturing the information and serving as a more relatable 
teaching tool for professors and instructors. 
A former junior officer from the submarine community arranged a meeting 
between current junior officers and young enlisted service-members with a design and 
innovation team from IDEO. The group’s purpose was to use the technological 
experiences of the younger generation of submariners to help guide and define the future 
of the community. Throughout the effort, from the design meeting to the implementation, 
there was a mix of proponents and those who were less enthusiastic that served to present 
most of the classic change management issues such as:  an internal champion, selectivity 
of the personnel invited to the design exercise, experimentation and prototyping, active 
and passive resistance and the co-opting of the effort when it appeared to be headed for 
success.   
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Given this richness of detail and the recency with which it occurred, this case is 
optimal for turning into a scholarly case study. Many lessons can be learned with relation 
to smart management and change implementation. Additionally, the fact that this 
happened within the last year should mean that the information would be relatively easy 
to gather from those participants willing to be interviewed by the researcher.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The DoD does not have records of historical technological change 
implementation. This lack of case study material limits the ability of educators to provide 
directly relevant material to students in DoD institutions and the ability of IT 
professionals in the work force to examine cases similar to those they find themselves in 
routinely. 
D. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
This research aims to develop an in depth case study of a large-scale change effort 
involving design thinking, innovation and the implementation of new technology. This 
case study highlights change related issues that will serve to develop knowledge to assist 
DoD in future technological change initiatives. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the organizational dynamics involved in introducing a 
participative, technological design thinking process within the traditional, 
bureaucratic setting of DoD?   
• What cultural factors facilitate and / or constrain efforts to introduce 
design thinking in DoD? 
F. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research was performed using the case study method as described by Carter V. Good 
in a 1941 article in The Journal of Educational Research. The case study is designed to 
capture all relevant aspects of one specific event or series of events. The case recorded in 
the study then consists of situations, people, behavior and other factors that are examined 
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to discover the “causal factors operating.”11  This method is not to be confused with the 
fields of casework or the case method. Good continues to describe casework as a field 
related to addressing diagnosed issues including those discovered through a case study. 
The case method on the other hand is an educational technique in which a case is used as 
an example to provoke thought and discussion on the part of students. Again, the case 
method is typically an evolution of information gathered during a case study.12   
The setting chosen for this research case is the U.S. Navy’s Submarine 
Community. The Submarine community introduced a participative design process for the 
purpose of improving technology that facilitates situational awareness in the submarine’s 
control room. The research method is a case study utilizing ethnographic interviews of 
key participants involved in the change process. A total of 19 research participants were 
interviewed along with several discussions with current members of the submarine force 
in various settings such as during a tour of a submarine that was at the pier during a 
research visit, at the Officer’s Club and during meals.  (see attachment – include numbers 
by units – two enlisted, two prior enlisted, two junior officers, four civilians with prior 
junior officer fleet submarine experience, three civilians, two retired senior officers, and 
four facilitators from IDEO). 
G. PROPOSED DATA, OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
The case study method has been in common usage since at least 1930, when 
Francis N. Maxfield said, “It is becoming generally recognized that in dealing in any 
practical way with human relationships and adjustments there is considerable advantage 
in developing a case-study technique.”13  Many of Maxfield’s proposals are similar, with 
different language, when compared to the current work of Robert Stake in The Art of 
Case Study Research.14  Both authors acknowledge that it is a practical impossibility to 
                                                 
11 Carter V. Good, "Case Study and Case Work." The Journal of Educational Research 35, no. 3 
(November 1941): 218-220. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Francis N. Maxfield, "The Case Study." Educational Research Bulletin, March 1930. 
14 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1995. 
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record every aspect of a case. Completeness is relative, and absolute completeness is 
unattainable.   
The authors also agree that perspectives gathered should be crosschecked for 
validity of generalized sentiments. This was done using Stake’s triangulation methods. 
Finally the authors are in agreement that an important portion of the work of the case 
study researcher is to add their opinions of what was found, based upon their research and 
experience, to the record as a form of synthesis of the case. This was done throughout the 
following case study based on the interviews, both formal and informal, and the literature 
review conducted.   
In order to capture and represent the emotions and motivations of the actors in the 
case to the best of the researcher’s ability, triangulation was used to define pivotal factors 
in the case. Following Stake the researchers sought multiple perspectives to create a 
holistic picture of events and did not seek a singular interpretation.15  Rather efforts were 
made to include the dilemmas and internal conflicts of the actors, even when these actors 
reported conflicting interpretations of the same events. 
H. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
As this researcher was conducting research into change planning for the 
implementation of cloud technology within the DoD it became apparent that there was a 
lack of historical information regarding Information Technology implementation 
attempts. Even with respect to the implementation of NMCI, the largest network project 
in the U.S. government, there were only four case studies on record, and only two of 
those were academic case studies. This research is an attempt to capture a change effort 
for follow-on analysis and for use as an educational tool for any and all personnel who 
will be involved in IT related decision-making, and in this day and age all decision-
making is IT related. 
                                                 




A case study has limitations. They present a case from several perspectives, but it 
is impossible to capture the true internal workings of a subject’s emotional being with 
complete accuracy. This can be offset through use of triangulation. Triangulation is an 
attempt on the part of the researchers to correlate statements and actions of a subject 
throughout the case to lend credence to an interpretation.   
A case study is a representation of one event or series of events. While a case 
study is by definition limited to one series of events, the lessons to be learned from a rich, 
detailed case can be generalized by future readers for use in their careers as IT managers 
and military leaders. 
There is a lack of current DoD IT related case study material for use at institutions 
such as NPS. Given the rate of technological change and the billions of dollars lost in IT 
investments, this researcher would recommend that all large, possibly ACAT 1, projects 
and attempts at technological innovation should receive the attention of case study 
researchers. The availability of more recent materials for use in class might enable 
students to relate to the material. 
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
1. Chapter II: The Nuclear Navy, Change Management and Design 
Thinking 
Chapter II will provide a thorough discussion of the literature relevant to this case. 
In particular, the literature will be examined in three sections. The initial discussion will 
be of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine forces, their history, missions and culture. 
Section two will cover change management literature with a focus on Professor John 
Kotter’s work. The third and final section will examine the field of design and design 
thinking, and the growing body of work that supports its use in change management and 
IT management. 
2. Chapter III:  The Events in the Case of TANG 
Chapter III will consist of a case study built upon the interviews of several 
submariners, and the civilians that support their community. The details and stories of 
10 
 
those involved will be folded together to form a mostly chronological retelling of the 
events and emotions involved in the effort. 
3. Chapter IV:  Analysis 
Chapter IV will focus on an analysis of design thinking and change management 
and how the two compare and contrast as tools for the implementation of IT related 
change. 
4. Chapter V:  Conclusion 
Chapter V will provide discussion of the research questions and any 
recommendations. The recommendations will be both those directed at future research 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the qualitative nature of case study research, there were few readings 
known to be of relevance prior to commencement. As the research unfolded, the need to 
understand various elements of the case, whether people, beliefs or environment, directed 
the course of literature discovery. Over time, it became clear that this case was a blending 
of issues involved in change management and design thinking. This literature review was 
therefore guided by those two fields and will attempt to serve as a basis for further later 
comparison and contrast during the case study’s analysis. 
B. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
1. Introduction 
Change management is a field of study directed at improving the success rate of 
the implementation of changes within organizations. There are numerous frameworks for 
thinking about and planning organizational change. For this research, the focus points 
were Professor John P. Kotter’s works:  1996’s Leading Change and 2002’s The Heart of 
Change, and David Gleicher’s change formula as modified by Dannemiller and Jacobs in 
their 1992 article, Changing the Way Organizations Change. Additionally, several other 
books including Professor Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline were used to broaden the 
discussion and highlight various aspects of change.   
2. Creating Change 
An excellent introduction to the concepts underlying change management can be 
found in practically any writing on David Gleicher’s change formula. Kathleen D. 
Dannemiller and Robert W. Jacobs simplified the formula in 199216. The revised formula 
is: 
                                                 
16 Kathleen D. Dannemiller and Robert W. Jacobs, "Changing the Way Organizations Change: A 
Revolution of Common Sense." Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 1992. 
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D x V x F > R 
That is to say that D represents dissatisfaction with the status quo, V represents 
the proposed vision of the future, F represents the first steps taken toward the vision, and 
R is the amount of resistance to be overcome.17  Each of these values is relative with no 
absolute, objective measure being possible. Examining this change formula 
mathematically, it becomes apparent that for a change effort to succeed, the product of 
the dissatisfaction, the vision and the first steps must be greater than the total amount of 
resistance applied against the change. It is also apparent that if any of the three factors 
working to create the change is absent, then that side of the equation goes to zero, and the 
resistance is almost assuredly greater than that.18  This formula does not guarantee the 
success of a change effort. The knowledge of the basics required for change to take place 
does however help frame or focus a discussion on the subject as it regards an 
organization.   
This researcher has not seen it stated explicitly in any work discussing Gleicher’s 
formula, but other books on change highlight the fact that change management is a 
discussion or analysis of people’s behavior.19  Even in the equation it becomes obvious. 
The dissatisfaction and the vision are things provided by management or leadership to the 
members of the organization. The first steps are a plan drawn up by management for the 
organization’s members to follow, and personnel, likely at all levels of the organization, 
generate the resistance.   
In his Heart of Change, Kotter further refines his statement that change is an issue 
of people’s behavior by adding that “speaking to people’s feelings” is the action that 
effects the change.20  He puts forth the opinion that people are significantly less likely to 
alter their behavior when provided with a reasoned analysis aimed at impacting their 
                                                 
17 Kathleen D. Dannemiller and Robert W. Jacobs, "Changing the Way Organizations Change: A 
Revolution of Common Sense." Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 1992. 
18 Ibid. 
19 John P. Kotter, The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organizations. 




thoughts, than if they are “shown a truth that influences their feelings.”21  It may be 
possible to convince someone that something is in his or her best interests with facts, but 
that is unlikely to create the behavioral change. That requires an emotional connection to 
the change and the reason for the change. To conclude that line of thought Kotter states, 
“The flow of see-feel-change is more powerful than that of analysis-think-change.”22  
Jonathan Haidt says it well in his book, The Righteous Mind:  Why Good People are 
Divided by Politics and Religion, “You can’t make a dog happy by forcibly wagging its 
tail. And you can’t change people’s minds by utterly refuting their arguments.”23  
Who are these people though?  In Crossing the Chasm, Geoffrey A. Moore 
divides technology adopters into five categories based on their personal technology 
adoption timeline. The spectrum of adoption is distributed along a bell curve. By 
replacing the phrase technology adoption with change adoption, the same theory may be 
used to examine the organization’s population with regard to the change effort. 
The first group is the “laggards.”  The laggards occupy one narrow end of the 
curve. Laggards are unlikely to ever adopt the new technology until the technology they 
are currently using is no longer serviceable, if they agree to use any technology at all, and 
they are forced to make a transition.24  As regards change, these are the people who 
would never want the organization to change for any reason and will continue the 
trajectory to obsolescence or bankruptcy. 
Next is the “late majority.”25  The late majority occupies the spot on the curve 
between laggards and the centerline, or the average. This section of the population is 
                                                 
21 John P. Kotter, The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organizations. 
Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2002. Kindle location 112, 125. 
22 Ibid.  Kindle location 129. 
23 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2012. Kindle page 47. 
24 Geoffrey A.Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream 
Customers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1991. Kindle location 353. 
25 Ibid. Kindle location 348. 
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willing to adopt the technology or change, but they do not feel comfortable with what is 
being presented to them and want to see it proven before they adopt it.26 
The third group is termed the “early majority.”27  This group is relatively 
comfortable with the change, but, guided by caution and practical considerations, they 
want to see the new technology or change implementation succeed at another 
organization’s risk before their adoption.28 
Fourth is the “early adopter.”29  The early adopter “appreciate(s) the benefits of a 
new technology,” and they are able to “relate these potential benefits to their other 
concerns.”30  In the realm of change, these people may not have been part of the team 
implementing the change, but they realize how this may potentially benefit them in their 
efforts within the organization. 
The final group is the “innovators.”31  In Moore’s technology-centric model, the 
innovators are those who have a passion for technology.  “At root they are intrigued with 
any fundamental advance and often make a technology purchase simply for the pleasure 
of exploring the new device’s properties.”32  In a change organization, these would be the 
change leading manager or executive. The individual would be driven by the desire to try 
the latest ideas or possibilities within their organization’s space. 
Where Kotter expands upon the discussion of change management is through 
providing organizational leadership with an “eight-stage change process” in Leading 
Change.33  Through discussions with corporate leadership, he has discovered that while 
the stages may overlap, they need to be kept in sequence in order for them to build upon 
                                                 
26 Geoffrey A.Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream 
Customers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1991. Kindle location 348. 
27 Ibid. Kindle location 348. 
28 Ibid. Kindle location 343. 
29 Ibid. Kindle location 338. 
30 Ibid. Kindle location 338. 
31 Ibid. Kindle location 334. 
32 Ibid. Kindle location 338. 
33 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995. Kindle location 353. 
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one another toward the change.34  He then divides the eight stages into three logical 
groups and goes on to list likely reasons for any organizational resistance.   
The first four stages are focused on preparing the change space for the desired 
new direction. The next three steps are the introduction of the new direction, and step 
eight is where the newly implemented change is made to become a part of the fabric of 
the organization itself so that the change might be a lasting one.35  
The eight stages of Kotter’s change process are: 
• Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
• Creating the Guiding Coalition 
• Developing a Vision and Strategy 
• Communicating the Change Vision 
• Empowering Broad-Based Action 
• Generating Short-Term Wins 
• Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
• Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture36 
Additionally, most of the eight stages can be mapped to Gleicher’s change 
formula. Stage one corresponds to the dissatisfaction with the status quo. Stages two 
through four correspond with the proposed future vision of the organization. Finally, 
stages five, six and seven are the first steps toward the change.   
a. Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
The purpose of establishing a sense of urgency is to loosen the grip of 
complacency upon the organization. As the change formula shows, a sense of 
dissatisfaction must be developed within the members of the organization. This is what 
                                                 
34 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995.  Kindle location 403. 
35 Ibid.  Kindle location 376. 
36 Ibid.  Kindle location 375. 
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creates the willingness to be open to a new vision. If the individuals within the 
organization feel that they are satisfied, they will never embrace a change.37 
b. Creating the Guiding Coalition 
Wholesale change efforts tend to appear, from external to the organization, 
as the product of one person. Kotter mentions Lee Iacocca’s transformation of Chrysler in 
the 1980s as an example of the credit for change being laid at the feet of an individual.38  
This holds true today as well. With Chrysler’s 2009 – 2011 turnaround, the current CEO 
is being lauded for the turnaround in a 60 Minutes interview.39  The reality of the events 
is likely much different.   
Any leader in the civilian world or within the military must develop a core 
group of supporters for his change effort. A change vision may not exist yet, but this core 
group should be comprised of those adventurous “early adopters” that are motivated to 
improve the organization.40 
c. Developing a Vision and Strategy 
The vision’s purpose is to “direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of 
large numbers of people.”41  This tool should be created by the leader, but preferably 
with the help of the guiding coalition. As shown in the 1995 Charlotte Beers case from 
the Harvard Business School, it was the guiding coalition that came together to define the 
vision of the company’s future.42  Sometimes the leader only needs to know that a 
change is required. The collective talent of the organization can be leveraged to define 
the path from there.   
                                                 
37 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995.Kindle location 521-532. 
38 Ibid.Kindle location 762. 
39 CBS News. Sergio Marchionne: Resurrecting Chrysler. March 25, 2012. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7403188n (accessed September 16, 2012).  
40 Geoffrey A. Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to 
Mainstream Customers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1991. Kindle location 297. 
41 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995. Kindle location 183. 
42 Steckler, Nicole. "Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy and Mather Worldwide (A)." Managing Change. 
Harvard Business School, 1995. 141-159. 
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Kotter’s rule for corporate visions:  “Whenever you cannot describe the 
vision driving a change initiative in five minutes or less and get a reaction that signifies 
both understanding and interest, you are in for trouble.”43  This clear and simple vision 
statement should paint the picture of the future for the organization.   
d. Communicating the Change Vision 
The vision creates its maximum effect when all members of the 
organization have a common knowledge and understanding of it and embrace it.44  Often, 
organizational leadership will under-communicate the vision they have created for the 
company.45  The day for an average employee is crowded with many other competing 
inputs. It is not enough to share the vision once or twice and then assume that the entire 
population of the organization understands the new direction. Another part of vision 
communication is “leadership by example.”46  The surest method for undermining the 
vision is to act in a manner inconsistent with the message being communicated. 
e. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action 
Kotter breaks this down into the removal of four types of “barriers to 
empowerment” of an organization’s employees. The first barriers are structural. Does the 
structure of the organization prevent the effective actions of the employees as they work 
to embrace the change?47  The second set of barriers is skill related. Have the employees 
been given the appropriate set of skills and the training they require to make the 
change?48  Thirdly, are systems related barriers. Have the old processes within the 
organization been altered to reflect the new direction?  The example Kotter gives relates 
to performance evaluation. The company had shifted to a customer-focused organization, 
                                                 
43 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995.Kindle location 202. 
44 Ibid. Kindle location 1270. 
45 Ibid. Kindle location 1400. 
46 Ibid. Kindle location 1442. 
47 Ibid. Kindle location 1548. 
48 Ibid. Kindle location 1610. 
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but performance was still measured against not making mistakes.49  Finally, are the 
supervisors themselves a barrier to adoption of the change?  Are your subordinate leaders 
acting counter to the new vision and ruining the impression of the entire leadership 
structure? 
f. Generating Short-Term Wins 
While guiding the organization toward the future vision, the people within 
it need to see some concrete results today. Kotter refers to this as “manag(ing) the current 
reality.”50  It maintains the momentum of the change, and it builds credibility in the eyes 
of those who are still undecided about it.51  The worthwhile short-term win is defined as 
one that is visible, unambiguous and obviously related to the change effort underway.52 
g. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
The resistance to a change effort never dissipates completely.53  A 
constant pressure is required to keep the change effort progressing until the final results 
are achieved. Something as simple as celebrating a short-term victory can send the 
message that no further effort is required and the slide back into the previous way of 
doing things can begin.54 
h. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 
This is a continuation of the previous stage, but it goes beyond the 
achievement of the desired results. This extends to the point that the results become self-
sustaining.55  The departure of one individual should not completely derail the change if 
the organization has internalized the state of being at every level. 
                                                 
49 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995. Kindle location 1654. 
50 Ibid. Kindle location 1772. 
51 Ibid. Kindle location 1772. 
52 Ibid. Kindle location 1817. 
53 Ibid. Kindle location 1983. 
54 Ibid. Kindle location 1983. 
55 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995. Kindle location 2197. 
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i. Resistance to Change 
Working against all of the effort placed into the change of the organization 
is a constant pressure toward maintaining the status quo that must be overcome, as the 
change formula indicates, for the effort to succeed. Kotter states that there are forces 
working against the initial launch of the change implementation, and there are forces 
working against the effort throughout its life cycle.56 
In Heart of Change, Kotter’s four types of behavior that tend to derail the 
launch of a change effort are:  “The first is complacency, driven by false pride or 
arrogance. A second is immobilization, self-protection, a sort of hiding in the closet, 
driven by fear or panic. Another is you-can’t-make-me-move deviance, driven by anger. 
The last is a very pessimistic attitude that leads to constant hesitation.”57 
Kotter’s eight reasons for resistance throughout the change’s life cycle, 
from Leading Change, are: 
• Inwardly Focused Cultures 
• Paralyzing Bureaucracy 
• Parochial Politics 
• Low Levels of Trust 
• Lack of Teamwork 
• Arrogant Attitudes 
• Lack of Leadership in Middle Management 
• The General Human Fear of the Unknown58 
The final aspect of resistance to change is that as contentious as the 
struggle between the innovators and early adopters against the laggards may be, there is 
no blame. The entire organization works as a system. As Senge points out, there is no 
                                                 
56 Ibid. Kindle location 1996. 
57 John P. Kotter, The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organizations. 
Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2002. Kindle location 338. 
58 John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. 1995. Kindle location 362. 
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“‘separate other;’ that you and the other person are part of a single system. The cure lies 
in your relationship with the ‘enemy.’”59 
j. Conclusion 
Change management is an invaluable resource when faced with 
implementing organizational change. However, it does not guarantee success. It only 
improves the odds that the effort will be successful. The field also does not actually 
outline how to create a vision or the steps necessary to implement it in a practical sense. 
Something else is required to remove the last level of abstraction from the discussion. 
C. DESIGN 
1. Introduction 
In itself, the change management field does not provide any guidance for creating 
the change. Change management appears to exist at a higher level of abstraction and 
there is a separate requirement to bring it into practical application. For instance, where it 
advises to target the feelings of the organization members that might drive their change 
adoption, it does not provide guidance for how to bring that about. Thankfully, there is a 
broadening overlap with the field of design and design thinking. 
As an example, in the previously mentioned Charlotte Beers change case, Beers 
assembled a team to build a vision for the company’s future. The details are few, but the 
description of the meeting in Vienna as putting “a diversity of talents in a climate of 
disruption” reads like a design session.60   
As was recommended in the change management discussion of Moore’s Crossing 
the Chasm, wherever the reader of a design or design thinking work encounters the word 
customer, the words sailor or service member will fit within the context. Similarly, 
                                                 
59 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New 
York: Currency Doubleday, 1990. Kindle page 67. 
60 Nicole Steckler, "Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy and Mather Worldwide (A)." Managing Change. 
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Admiral, Captain or “anyone who assumes a leadership role” may be substituted for CEO 
or manager. 
2. Design vs. Design Thinking 
There are currently multiple expectations entwined within the meaning of design. 
When this researcher first heard the word design mentioned during the course of 
interviews conducted for this case, the idea conveyed was of people being given a 
product and then making it look attractive in an effort to sell more units of the product. In 
his book, Design-Driven Innovation, Roberto Verganti states that the general impression 
of most corporate executives is one of product styling.61  In other words, after a product 
is created and engineered, it is then handed over to designers for an appealing image. 
Verganti then compares that vision of design with a newer, emergent version that is 
centered on the user’s experience. This version of design is involved from the discussion 
of what needs to be done all the way through to the final product’s eventual display. 
In an effort to clarify, this document will refer to the latter version as “design 
thinking” in accordance with Tom Brown’s original description from Change by Design:  
“Design thinking relies on our ability to be intuitive, to recognize patterns, to construct 
ideas that have emotional meaning as well as functionality, to express ourselves in media 
other than words or symbols.”62  Another definition that brings the topic of design 
thinking into focus comes from Richard J. Boland and Fred Collopy in Managing as 
Designing. They state that, “A good design solution solves many problems, often ones 
that were not envisioned in its development.”63 
Design thinking is a rapidly iterative process. It stands apart from the typical 
“linear problem-solving” techniques that most military officers have seen used 
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throughout their careers.64  Jeanne Liedtka and Tim Ogilvie in, Designing for Growth, 
contrast the two by describing typical problem-solving processes as problem definition, 
solution identification and analysis followed by the selection of the “right” choice.65  
Designers, by contrast, base their solution upon empathy and experimentation.66 
Professor Senge doesn’t explicitly discuss participative design thinking, but he 
does highlight the importance of design thinking to an organization. He views the role of 
a “leader as designer” as being neglected in terms of how organizational leaders view 
themselves.67  Senge recognizes the need for leadership to drive the design of the 
organization itself with a focus on the interactions of the members of the organization.68 
Design thinking moves beyond persuading people to purchase or invest based on 
appearances alone. It is intended to be a framework for tackling any problem, internal or 
external, faced by the organization. Senge hints at the reason the introduction of design 
thinking to a modern organization:  “It’s just not possible any longer to figure it out from 
the top, and have everyone else following the orders of the ‘grand strategist.’ The 
organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that discover 
how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization.”69 
3. Design Thinking 
Liedtka and Ogilvie list three basic “growth lessons” observed from those who 
have been successful design thinking in their experience. They also list several other 
“maxims for growth,” of which two are of particular relevance to the DoD. The growth 
lessons:   
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You don’t have to search far and wide to find opportunities. There are 
opportunities to improve through design in everything we do and what we surround 
ourselves with.”   
You don’t have to bet big in order to be successful. In fact, big bets often cause 
failure. Place small bets fast, and learn learn learn.   
Speed thrills. Developing a corporate climate that thinks, moves and innovates 
fast can become addictive and lead to continuous improvements and learning.70 
The relevant maxims for growth are:  1. “Focus on meeting genuine needs,” and 
2. “Explore multiple options.”71  The first tip is telling the reader to empathize with the 
customer or group that the product, process or organization is being designed for. The 
second is referring to prototyping of several options at once. This is not the same form of 
prototyping that the DoD performs when procuring major systems through the 
acquisitions process. This version of prototyping is using inexpensive materials to 
examine the problem as opposed to building a couple of multi-million dollar weapon 
systems to compete against one another and be analyzed for failure modes.72   
a. Innovation 
Before preceding much further, it is necessary to differentiate between 
design and innovation. Senge describes an innovation as an invention that can be reliably 
recreated at a practical cost.73  Based on this it can be deduced that design thinking is 
likely to generate innovation, but an innovation may or may not incorporate design 
thinking. 
All readings on innovation, design and design thinking agree that most 
established organizations have over time refined themselves into a specialized form for 
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the efficient performance of routine activities.74  This is not a fault of the company, but a 
natural tendency to maximize a cost to benefit ratio.75  However, in The Other Side of 
Innovation, the authors argue that this specialization places two parts of the organization 
into conflict.76 
The two sides of the organization in conflict for the limited resources of 
the organization are termed the “performance engine” and the innovators.77  These are 
similar in concept to James March’s “exploitation” and “exploration,” respectively.78  In 
both cases, one segment of the organization is focused on maintaining the efficient and 
profitable daily operations while the other segment is attempting to find new products or 
processes. Additionally in both cases, the two are portrayed as in conflict and competing 
for organizational resources. Multiple sources agree that the typical organization is not 
adept at continuously refining the balance of the exploration and exploitation over time.79  
If this argument is accepted, then leadership must assume responsibility for providing the 
balance of the two.   
b. Empathy 
If modern design thinking is framed around creating an experience for the 
user, the natural extension if this is a need to empathize with the group that the product or 
process is intended for. Liedtka and Ogilvie go as far as to say that, “Design starts with 
empathy, establishing a deep understanding of those we are designing for.”80  These two 
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are not alone. Several other works on design mention empathy and give it a central 
position in their design philosophies.   
Tim Brown, CEO and President of IDEO, describes empathy as the 
primary difference between what design thinkers do and academic efforts. In his words, 
“We are not trying to generate new knowledge, test a theory, or validate a scientific 
hypothesis—that’s the work of our university colleagues and an indispensable part of our 
shared intellectual landscape. The mission of design thinking is to translate observations 
into insights and insights into products and services that will improve lives.”81 
In Wired to Care, Dev Patnaik, describes empathy as “seeing the world as 
it really is.”82  That seems unlikely to be the case. But, empathy is a matter of putting 
yourself in someone else’s frame of reference and trying to understand how they 
experience their reality. Therefore, it is unlikely that the observer is actually seeing the 
world the way it is, but perhaps seeing it through the eyes of those they are designing for 
is a more relevant goal. 
c. The Design Process 
There are numerous versions of the design process. For this discussion, 
and due to its free availability at the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford, also 
known as d.school, website, the focus will primarily be upon their Bootcamp Bootleg83. 
The Bootleg serves to bring together most of the design process elements from the other 
readings mentioned. Where necessary, other design works will be used to expand on the 
theme. 
The Bootcamp Bootleg lists five phases of their design process. They start 
with “empathize,” and move through “define,” “ideate,” and “prototype” to conclude 
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with testing. Several other design readings either explicitly add or imply the existence of 
another phase that appears to belong prior to empathize phase.84   
(1) The Brief. Prior to the empathic investigation of the 
project, a brief is delivered to the designers. The brief primarily consists of goals and 
constraints. The goals appear to be relatively straightforward, but from speaking to 
several designers, they typically require some examination and change over time.85  The 
reason for this is that a customer arrives with a set goal for the design effort. It is often 
necessary to remove that initial request or problem to a higher level of abstraction. For 
instance, “How do we improve aluminum can recycling on Wednesdays?” might become, 
“How do we increase awareness of recycling opportunities?”86  Stanford’s d.school and 
Tim Brown in Change by Design, describe these questions as “How might we” questions 
or “HMWs.”87  Thus the brief itself is a living thing to be remade as events demand.   
In Design Thinking, Nigel Cross describes his thoughts on a brief by 
explaining that this looseness in the brief is to allow the designers to define the problem 
as they are attempting to solve it.88  The brief is also not to be considered a concrete set 
of requirements or specifications for the final product. Cross relays a statement from an 
interview conducted with the architect Richard MacCormac about design, “Often in 
competitions the winning scheme is the one that tells the client something that they never 
knew before … something that is terribly important to them and was not in the brief.”89 
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The brief should also be neither too restrictive nor too broad.90  
Constraints are a helpful necessity, but with too many the options for creative ideas are 
reduced.91  If there are too few constraints, the ideas may not be applicable to the 
problem.92  Examples of constraints include cost, size and weight, but might just as easily 
refer to a type of technology or a portion of a customer base. Alternatively, the brief 
could aim to utilize something internal to the organization as the constraint, such as the 
size of the sleeping quarters aboard a ship.93   
(2) Empathize. The empathize phase is more commonly 
referred to as observation, but in both cases the goal is the same.94  Tom Kelley, IDEO’s 
General Manager, emphasizes in The Art of Innovation, that it is necessary to focus the 
designer’s empathy toward the actual user for the product or process.95  This can be 
difficult considering that unless the design project is something internal to the 
organization funding the project, those sought out to empathize with are not likely to be 
the ones paying for the project.96 
Peter Senge best describes what is being sought through this 
empathize phase. It is probable that the best insight to be gleaned from the research will 
be something small.  “Small changes can produce big results –but the areas of highest 
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leverage are often the least obvious.”97  He goes on to describe a systems thinking 
version of leverage that is appropriate to the styles of insight sought by designers. Senge 
discusses that the obvious methods for creating an impact on a prject are unlikely to 
create the desired effect. However, in his words, “…small, well-focused actions can 
sometimes produce significant, enduring improvements, if they’re in the right place.”98  
The ultimate goal is to find the point at which the maximum effort may be applied to 
produce the greatest effect for the customer’s user experience.99 
(3) Define.  The define stage is what IDEO has referred to in 
interviews as generating insights.100  It is what is done with all of the information, 
feelings and emotions gathered during the research and empathize portion of the design 
thinking process. Seldom can the user describe what is missing or required to perform 
their job in the form of a complete solution. It is typically necessary to synthesize the 
inputs of the users into a couple of insights. 
These insights are then used to guide the “point of view” of the 
design sessions.101  This point of view serves to define the focus of the design on the 
needs of the user. This vision should also serve as an inspiration to the design team and 
be the source of the “How might we” questions used to generate the brainstorming in the 
next phase.102 
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(4) Ideate. This has been more generically referred to as 
brainstorming. The goal is to create a large base of ideas from which to later choose.103  
In the words of two-time Nobel Prize winning chemist Linus Pauling, “To have a good 
idea, you must first have lots of ideas.”104  Tom Kelley calls brainstorming “the idea 
engine of IDEO’s culture.”105  The previously mentioned HMWs are also used to focus 
brainstorming sessions, and IDEO has seven self-explanatory rules for the sessions.106  
• Defer Judgment 
• Encourage Wild Ideas 
• Build on the Ideas of Others 
• Stay Focused on Topic 
• One Conversation at a Time 
• Be Visual 
• Go for Quantity107 
Occasionally, before starting a brainstorming session, it might be 
helpful to loosen up the participants in the brainstorming.108  During the research, this 
was expanded by a practical example of asking participants to create a list of technologies 
with the expected potential to contribute to a design solution.109  Tom Kelley provides 
guidance for four situations when the time spent warming a group up is worth the 
commensurate time lost for brainstorming.  “When the group has not worked together 
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before. When most of the group doesn’t brainstorm frequently. When the group seems 
distracted by pressing but unrelated issues.”110    
There are two additional pieces of guidance for a successful 
brainstorming, or ideation, session and a list of things to be avoided or risk limiting the 
options created. Multiple sources recommend sketching as a method to contribute an idea 
during brainstorming.111  Nigel Cross refers to these brainstorming sketches as 
“temporary, external store for tentative ideas” to help the designer examine and convey 
more complete ideas where words might not be sufficient.112  The second idea is that a 
typical brainstorming session should be limited to sixty minutes due to the mental 
exertion required by the activity.113   
It should be apparent from the descriptions that the brainstorming 
is a relatively free process with some guidelines and constraints to ensure a relevant set of 
outputs to choose from later. Tom Kelly provides a convenient list of things to avoid in 
order to maximize the potential of an ideation session.  “Six Ways to Kill a 
Brainstormer”“ 
• The Boss Gets To Speak First 
• Everybody Gets A Turn 
• Experts Only Please  
• Do It Off-Site  
• No Silly Stuff  
• Write Down Everything114  
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Once a field of ideas has been created, the ideas are then grouped 
according to function or some other metric.115  Depending on the number of ideas in a 
group, it might be necessary to form them into sub-groups.116  After the ideas are 
grouped, it is necessary to select the most popular ideas from the group, and some form 
of voting typically does this.117 
(5) Prototyping. The prototyping phase is about bringing the 
ideas selected from brainstorming into a more physical setting.118  The designers feel this 
is more engaging and creates an environment in which it is easier to envision the 
potential solution and how it may be altered to better meet the needs of the brief; it also 
enables decision making about such things as which features are relevant.119 
Prototyping additionally serves as a method of reducing risk.120  
This is the same school of thought that DoD has used for project management for years, 
but done at a much earlier point. The difference is that this is done in order to engage the 
imagination through tactile interaction with a very low cost, low risk form of possible 
solutions. In this way, the project is defined through experimentation at low cost. This is 
in accordance with research that has shown that investment in the requirements and 
design phases of software can reduce the costs of error correction after delivery by a 
factor of 100.121  Through this physical manifestation of the ideas from brainstorming, 
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those participating in the prototyping are now capable of providing feedback on an 
experiential basis as compared to logical descriptions of a capability.122 
These early prototypes are intended to be created and evaluated 
quickly and cheaply.123  The point is to gain the benefits previously mentioned without 
creating emotional “overinvestment” on the part of the designer or design participant.124  
As described by Tim Brown, this rapid build and discard or move forward methodology 
guards against the risks associated with a poor idea moving forward and increases the 
chances of discovering new opportunities at a minimal cost.125  
Prototyping has even been done in this inexpensive fashion in the 
field of software engineering. In Change by Design, Brown mentions having seen 
“software interfaces mocked up with Post-it notes long before a line of code was 
written.” 126   This has been demonstrated recently by the events of this case study and 
can be seen by viewing the YouTube video for the TANG Forum.127 
(6) Testing. The testing phase is, in the literature, perhaps the 
least represented part of the design thinking phase. Most of the excitement generated in 
design thinking readings revolves around the brainstorming and prototyping phases. In 
essence though, those phases continue throughout the process. Testing is another 
opportunity to observe the user in action with the prototype.128  It is an opportunity to 
brainstorm about how to conduct the test itself, and then prototype the test if desired. It is 
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also a method for developing feedback on the prototypes and then iterating them based on 
the feedback.129 
d. Failure   
Another significant feature of design thinking is its tolerance for failure. 
According to Tim Brown, one of IDEO’s philosophies is “fail early to succeed 
sooner.”130  This acceptance of the inevitable consequence of the risks associated with 
any acquisition is, in the opinion of the researcher, one of the bigger differences between 
design thinking and the common analysis decision-making. This failure though is not the 
kind of big failure experienced as the congressional cancellation of a major acquisitions 
program. This is the failure of numerous ideas in the very early phases of development to 
help with requirements definition and project design. These failures are experienced at 
the very outset of the program and are cost effective forms of experimentation and 
iteration to an eventual output. As Professor Frank Barrett states in his book, Yes to the 
Mess, this acceptance of failure can often become “the pathway to discovery, especially 
in highly experimental and innovative cultures.”131 
e. Morale   
There are two additional aspects of design thinking and the design 
thinking process noted during the course of investigation. Both aspects relate to the 
morale of designers and participants as noted by researchers. First, Dev Patnaik 
highlights his belief that the process of building empathy creates a sense of enjoyment in 
the workplace.132   
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Second, Tom Kelley, states what should be obvious but is often 
overlooked in military units:  “When people feel special, they’ll perform beyond your 
wildest dreams.”  Along these lines, Kelley’s company throws large end-of-year parties 
and allows its employees to play “hooky” from time to time.133 
4. CONCLUSION 
Design, as is stated in the Bootcamp Bootleg, is difficult to convey in print.134  
The Bootleg, available freely from the d.school website, makes an excellent starting point 
for a design effort. Having observed a demonstration design session, it would appear to 
be when facilitated by those used to the process, but either way, design needs to be 
attempted and learned experientially. Having partaken in demonstration versions of the 
design thinking process, this researcher finds the process to be a potential answer to the 
problems plaguing DoD acquisitions whether it be a major weapons system or to design 
the interface for the household goods shipment website. In particular, that website could 
do with some design thinking. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Based on the literature reviewed and the case research conducted, there exists an 
excellent fit between the items of significance in the fields of change management and 
design thinking and the case that was researched. Lessons extracted from this case by an 
individual or group of readers are generalizable to other organizations even as this case 
was selected based upon specific points that serve to highlight relevant points of change 
management and design thinking. 
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III. CASE STUDY 
A. JOSH 
In the summer of 2010, a young former naval submarine officer and current 
employee of Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (APL), Josh Smith, was 
looking for a way to capitalize on the knowledge he had developed as a fleet submariner 
and tactics instructor. Now, Smith was specifically interested in using the balance of 
experience and open-mindedness of junior officers (JOs), “Lieutenants and below,” and 
enlisted, “First Class (Petty Officers) and below,” to guide nuclear submarine technology 
acquisition efforts in the Navy.135  Josh described his reasons for the white paper: 
There were a few reasons that motivated me to write the whitepaper, but 
none more important than the desire to create an environment where junior 
officers and operators could collaborate around ideas to make their lives 
on board the submarine better. During my time in the Navy as a JO, I 
witnessed some great instances of innovation both at the senior and junior 
level on the boat. These events were indicators of a powerful potential that 
could really change the submarine force. When junior officers and 
operators feel like they can make a difference and have a voice, their 
energy and motivation is intensified. My fellow JOs had some fantastic 
ideas that could greatly influence the quality of life, efficiency, and 
productivity of their divisions, the wardroom, and themselves. Without an 
outlet to express or try out these ideas, most concepts would stay within a 
group of 1 or 2. If it was a radical change to a process, it would require 
senior level involvement which is great, but also comes with another level 
of paperwork, convincing, socialization, etc…where the question is asked, 
“Is this worth going through all of the wickets to pitch my idea? What if 
it’s a dumb idea? Will I lose credibility?” The paper was my way of 
articulating what an environment would look like where junior officers 
and operators could collaborate openly and without fear of failure in front 
of their superiors. Also, if a few on one boat could make a big difference, 
then a group from multiple boats could collaborate and make something 
truly amazing. Giving this demographic a voice was my top motivation for 
the concept.   
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Another aspect is that the Navy invests a significant amount of money and 
time to train these officers and sailors to become the top performing 
warfighters in the submarine force. Their knowledge, insight, and ideas 
are an untapped resource if they leave the Navy after their first sea tour. 
Many of my counterparts were leaving the submarine force to take jobs in 
Corporate America or enrolling in business or law school. How could the 
submarine force tap into this knowledge and idea base before they leave 
the Navy? Some of my friends included ideas for improvement in their 
“letter of resignation” from the Navy, but where do those ideas go?  
B. APL 
The Applied Physics Lab is a “not-for-profit center for engineering, research and 
development” university laboratory division of The Johns Hopkins University located in 
Laurel, MD. The APL has a long history, since 1942, of assisting the U.S. military with 
complex and important research. Stemming from the requirements of World War II, a 
series of research laboratories, including APL, were created by the government in 
conjunction with acclaimed universities. The Laboratory’s most impactful contribution, 
an improved proximity fuse for anti-aircraft shells, would subsequently be judged one of 
the leading technological contributions to the war effort.136 
The Laboratory currently conducts research on behalf of over 600 programs. 
Sponsors for this research include the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland 
Security (DHS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) to help guide the direction of future development based 
upon “research, engineering, and analytical problems.”137  As an example, APL has 
handled the launch of 64 spacecraft for NASA.138  For the U.S. Navy’s submarine 
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community, this is manifested in the undersea warfare realm by providing unbiased 
opinions regarding development investments139.   
C. THE SUBMARINE 
The submarines referred to in this thesis are the Navy’s fast attack boats. These 
boats are significantly smaller than the ballistic missile submarines nicknamed 
‘boomers.’  This size difference is largely driven by their respective missions. A fast 
attack is required to be sleeker and faster in order to find, trail and destroy an enemy 
submarine. The boomer on the other hand is largely expected to stay deep, stay quiet and 
stay unlocated in order to be able to perform its strategic missile launch role.140   
Size constraints are probably the defining aspect of life aboard a submarine as 
viewed by an outsider. Every aspect of the boat is confining. Within minutes a visitor will 
be squeezing themselves sideways in order to allow others to pass in a passageway. 
Shoulders brush both sides of a passageway in the wide spots. The control room does not 
allow for many people to be in motion at any one time except through the coordination 
that can only come from long experience sharing the circumstances with your crew.   
The sleeping accommodations, “racks,” are so small as to appear incapable of 
containing an adult human being, and these racks are occasionally required to be shared 
such that one person has it while another is on duty. When the first person comes off of 
duty, it is then his turn to sleep in the rack that is likely still warm from the previous 
sailor. This tradition is known by submariners as ‘hot racking.’   
In other cases, the sailor or officer may be moved from his rack to accommodate 
ship-riders, those who are aboard the ship to observe a trial or test for instance. In that 
case, the relocated sailor is likely to find him or herself sleeping on a narrow mattress, the 
same over-small ones in their regular rack, but with a difference. These overflow berthing 
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racks are located in the torpedo room, underneath a rack of torpedoes, and they are 
pushed together with no separation. The good news, as relayed by a Lieutenant, was that 
on the occasions he had slept there, “I was so tired, because the boat was so busy, that I 
slept like a baby for 18 hours after I got off watch.”141  The overall feeling of the spaces 
is closer to Das Boot than the overly spacious depiction of the ballistic missile submarine 
depicted in Crimson Tide. 
D. THE SUBMARINE CULTURE 
From a blending of interviews, discussions and readings, this researcher’s 
perspective shifted to share the opinions of those within the community as they described 
themselves. The community is structured in a typical military hierarchy. Salutes were 
rendered as required and without fail. There is no shortage of bravery or courage in the 
organization.142  These are not fearful technocrats.   
All sources agreed that there is a rigid adherence to the rules of nuclear power in 
the boat’s engineering department. This procedural rigidity was imbued into the 
submariners as part of the nuclear power training regimen. Every potentiality has a 
written procedure to deal with it.143  All orders are repeated back verbatim.144   
Most submariners independently, without the researchers having mentioned it, 
identified these “competing cultures” as their defining cultural artifact. One submariner 
referred to this split as the source of “creeping-nukism.”  Creeping-nukism was 
mentioned by multiple interviewees, and was defined as the encroachment of the rigid, 
procedural culture of the aft portion of the boat, the reactor and engineering spaces, upon 
the forward half of the boat, the control and weapons area. These two flavors are referred 
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to as the “for” and “aft” portions of the boat. Creeping nuke-ism, it was felt, was the 
result of the first half of an officer’s first fleet tour being spent in the engineering 
department where the zero defect mentality and stringent procedural compliance were 
absolute. After being qualified in the engineering spaces, officers are moved to the 
“forward half” of the boat to gain experience on the weapons systems and qualify as the 
Officer of the Deck, the commanding officer’s direct representative in charge of the safe 
navigation of the vessel. It was a stated concern of several interviewees that many 
officers found it difficult to make the transition from the world of procedural compliance 
they faced “back aft” to the unscripted environment of the control room “up forward.”   
During the first year and a half or so of a JOs initial sea tour after reactor training, 
the officer is assigned to the engineering department to continue developing their 
knowledge of the reactor without interruption. After the completion of this first half of 
their tour, the officer moves to the forward section of the boat to gain experience with the 
navigation and tactical functions of the boat. Once an officer moves forward in the 
second half of their first tour though, there is a need to be more dynamically flexible to 
meet the requirements of an unscripted world. Here there develops a split between those 
who excel in the more academic environment of the reactor and those thrive on the 
irregularity of driving a vessel in three dimensions with none of the visual cues a surface 
ship’s crew has the benefit of. This split was attributed to both types of submarines, fast 
attack and boomer. 145   
From both sides of the fore and aft cultural divide came opinions of the junior 
personnel, both officer and enlisted, as developing “pockets of innovation.”  It was felt 
that from time to time, a good idea would come forward, but the requirements to enact 
that idea, whether administrative, engineering or operational in nature, became 
insurmountable obstacles. 
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One of the humorous community specific roles that this researcher had come upon 
previously with submariners served with that appeared during this research was:  
the ‘Finite Happiness Theory’ of life on a submarine. There is only so 
much happiness on a submarine at any time, and it is not enough for 
everybody. The only way to get this happiness is to take it from someone 
else, in the form of prodding or practical jokes, or just plain yelling at 
them. You hold on to this happiness for a little while, until someone takes 
it from you.”146 
Similar to most other U.S. military groups, the submarine community is a highly 
hierarchical organization where command and control flows along the Navy’s rank 
structure. The senior person onboard the boat is typically the Commanding Officer, a 
Navy Commander (CDR). The Commanding Officer is typically on his fourth sea tour, 
with roughly seven or eight deployments worth of experience. There are routinely to be 
found however, all manner of higher-ranking officers such as the Commodore for the 
Squadron, a Captain (CAPT) senior to the Commanding Officer with previous submarine 
command experience, or an Admiral.   
The second in command of the boat is the Executive Officer who is a Lieutenant 
Commander (LCDR) on his third sea tour. The Department Heads billets are filled by 
second tour Lieutenants (LT), and the Division Officer billets are manned by Ensigns 
(ENS) just out of their initial training. The Ensigns will most likely receive two 
promotions during their first tour including from ENS to Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) 
and then to LT shortly before they rotate to their first shore tour.   
The enlisted part of the crew consists of the Chief of the Boat (COB) who is the 
senior enlisted representative to the Commanding Officer. There are also Department and 
Divisional Chiefs whose role is to assist their officer counterpart and supervise the work 
and training of the junior enlisted. Serving within these divisions, is the vast majority of 
the crew – the most junior sailors on the boat. 
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Added to those factors, the nuclear submarine community has rooted in its origins 
a drive to maintain an absolute, zero defect, safety posture with respect to its boat’s 
nuclear reactor systems.147  These individuals see their mission as “do no harm” with 
respect to the boat’s control systems. In other words, nothing should be allowed to 
circumvent requirements to ensure the continued absolute safe operation of the boat and 
its systems. This sentiment is difficult to argue, but a couple of those interviewed during 
this research referred to this as another face of the creeping nuke-ism of the submarine 
culture.148  
Several interviewees described this fore and aft cultural divide.  “You hate the 
guys back aft…until someone else (outside the crew) says something about them.”149  
This submarine force wide split factored into the decision to focus TANG on the forward 
half, the sonar and tactical systems. It would have been next to impossible to make this 
happen in the engineering and reactor spaces according to those interviewed for this 
research. The safety requirements drive the process for enacting changes to be too time 
consuming for an agile response to technological improvements. With a naval reactor 
safety record of zero reactor related incidents, the methods have proven effective. 
The APB 
The Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet had been running a pair of programs in 
tandem to deliver technological progress aboard the boats. The software and algorithm 
updates were handled under the umbrella of the Advanced Processing Build (APB), and 
hardware updates by Technology Insertions (TI). The system was originally organized so 
that updates were to take place annually. Due to concerns from the fleet about 
maintaining readiness and qualifications, it was slowed to every other year. One year 
would be an APB and the next would be a TI. These improvements would be fielded in 
the two-year interim on those boats that came in for a scheduled shipyard period during 
that time.   
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The as-is method for addressing an increase in capabilities has been referred to by 
some interviewees as ‘knob-ology.’  Knob-ology is not an uncommon term in the naval 
service and is most commonly used to refer to technology development efforts. When a 
new capability is added to a system, there is often not a complete reworking of the system 
to fully integrate the functionality. Instead a new knob, an electronic potentiometer at one 
time, would be installed on an available piece of surface area. Later knob-ology 
manifested itself through the addition of new pages of software, or worse yet, one 
software function hidden on a page of unrelated software functions.150  
Given the number of submarines in the fleet, their deployment and yard 
schedules, the fleet would be comprised of a mixture of three or more hardware and 
software combinations at any one time. This leads to an unmanageable number of 
locations for a new sailor to look for a specific piece of functionality in the field of 
‘knobs.’  It was also therefore possible for a sailor to leave a boat that was outfitted with 
six-year-old equipment for three years of shore duty. He would then return to sea aboard 
a boat with technology that is a decade newer. These users found themselves asking 
questions like, “How do I X?” or “Where is functionality to do Y?” and “Why can’t the 
symbol to take a picture look like the symbol on my iPhone?”151 
E. APB ISSUES 
The last question came up during a story of a recent TI that incorporated “radical 
changes to the interface.”  Lieutenant Josh Hausbach was at sea familiarizing himself 
with a new console and trying to figure out which button would bring up a geographic 
plotting (geo-plot), or mapping, of the boat and other contacts being tracked by the watch 
team.   
There was a little button at the bottom, and it’s got a ‘G’ on it. I’m sitting 
there, and I’m clicking on it, and I’m like “Why is the geo-plot not coming 
up?”  Cause I see a ‘G,’ and I think geo-plot. And finally after sitting there 
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and pushing it for 30 or 40 times, I notice up at the top that it says ‘frame 
grab,’ and it has a date-time stamp on it. And it’s right now. I click it 
again, and it changes.  “Oh, that’s the take a picture button!”  So, through 
this process of feeding back to the APB folks, the very next software 
iteration Andy Leal went to the engineers, and took his phone.  “Do you 
see this camera button on here?  Turn this ‘G’ into the iPhone camera 
button.”  And now, if you want to take a picture… you push the camera 
button.152 
In 2009 and 2010, the control room technology update discussion had turned to 
“when is enough… enough?”  Fleet commanding officers and some senior leaders felt 
that the processing power and algorithms currently at sea were capable of meeting the 
fleet’s operational requirements. The desire was to allow the fleet to standardize on one 
version of the boat’s systems and possibly save money.   
The acquisition professionals within the submarine community pointed out that 
this idea was unfeasible. The submarine community has long been a customer of 
commercial off the shelf technology (COTS). With the rate of change and obsolescence 
within the technology industry, the cost of parts that are a decade out of date in the 
civilian world, if they’re even available, is exorbitant.153  A COTS acquisition strategy 
does provide some advantages however. COTS systems are typically significantly 
cheaper than a comparable military specification (MILSPEC) system.154  It also allows 
the submarine community to be more agile in response to threats and vulnerabilities of 
competitive nation’s military hardware.155  COTS systems had also been deemed to be 
cheaper for maintaining current simulators as of APB 07 than maintenance costs 
associated with the legacy simulators.156 
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There were also historical concerns over the durability of COTS systems given 
their unhardened nature as compared to mil spec systems. Vice Admiral (VADM) 
Richardson later addressed this concern with an illustrative story, “With a submarine 
hitting a submerged seamount at greater than 25 knots, the only piece of COTS 
equipment damaged, on a boat full of COTS gear, was a display that was damaged by a 
sailor thrown by the collision… We can’t be on the leading edge of technology. We’re 
one or two generations back where the technology is more reliable.”157 
There had also been problems with the APB process along the way. There was 
one APB version with enough software issues that a staffer would provide the 
commanding officer with the message he would need to send as soon as he put to sea in 
order to create a demand signal for the required fixes. Other builds had failed to pass their 
operational testing.158   
F. THE WHITE PAPER 
In an effort to promote a different approach to solving the problems facing the 
U.S. Navy’s submarine forces, Smith created and distributed within APL a white paper 
recommending that the Navy capitalize on the open-minded condition of more junior 
officers (JOs) and sailors within the fleet. His white paper, titled “Junior Officer Watch 
Team Innovation Conference,” and dated 1 June 2010, stated that: 
We have already observed younger sailors and officers’ success with new 
capabilities and technology during countless sea tests and Watch Section 
Task Analysis events.. Their dependence on “the way we’ve always done 
it” does not exist; instead it is replaced with an open mind and a desire to 
learn something new. Why is it that when new installments of the Madden 
Football Game are released with a different look and feel, you don’t hear 
complaints amongst the gaming community? (Instead, there is enthusiasm 
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and anticipation of the new version.) The gamer can usually adjust to these 
new controls and is up and running before the end of the day.159 
The paper went on to suggest that the use of the junior members of the crew 
would allow the submarine community’s future requirements to be defined by the watch 
team as a whole.160  This paper would later evolve into audience and support to form the 
Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation Forum that would involve the work of 
countless individuals to bring together technology industry leaders with 27 junior sailors 
and officers, meeting in San Diego, CA, in November of 2011, in order to create a more 
intuitive experience within the confines of a submarine. 
The paper was generally well received within APL, but found little traction 
outside of the organization. In the opinion of Bill Mahoney, an APL contractor, 
“Narrowband hadn’t changed in years. I thought it was great. Best idea I’d ever heard. 
We needed to work on Operator Machine Interface (OMI), but the group was working on 
‘knob-ology.’”161  OMI is the portion of systems engineering in the acquisitions process 
that aims to promote usability of equipment. 
John Stapleton, Director of Technology Strategy for APL’s submarine advanced 
development programs, agreed that the idea of using junior personnel was a good idea, 
saying that, “The submarine community has a corporate history of forward thinking.”162  
There were several other similar statements including an offline discussion specifically 
making mention of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the Father of the Nuclear Navy. In that 
discussion, the submariners around the table described him, reverently as an innovative 
engineer and a man who broke the rules whenever required to make progress that he saw 
as invaluable for his Navy and his country. First and foremost on the list of Rickover’s 
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courageous and innovative actions in the face of strong opposition was his decision to 
“place the first nuclear reactor inside a submersible pressure hull.”163   
By way of innovation comparison, in Walter Isaacson’s biography of Steve Jobs, 
Jobs is credited with either revolutionizing or reimagining seven industries.164  In 
Theodore Rockwell’s collection of tales regarding Rickover, this researcher counted up 
12, or 13 depending on one’s personal opinion, aspects of modern life that admiral had a 
lasting impact on. The list includes:  recruitment and training, shipbuilding, the materials 
industry, planning and budgeting, manufacturing, military construction projects, 
operating procedures and manuals, the electric utility industry, large equipment 
manufacturing, radiation and safety standards, technical information handling – 
dissemination and declassification, radiological engineering. The debated 13th field is 
education.165 
There were also pockets of resistance to the idea throughout the Navy, the APB 
development group, and, to a lesser extent, within APL itself. This use of junior 
personnel for developing weapons systems did not mesh with the way business was 
typically conducted within DoD. These pockets of resistance would turn into a recurring 
theme within the effort to bring the conference about. 
G. VADM RICHARDSON 
Vice Admiral John M. Richardson graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 
1982 and has since earned three Master’s Degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and the National War College. 
The admiral previously served on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and as a 
naval aide to the President.   The admiral’s four command tours, including his current 
role as Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (COMSUBFOR), were USS Honolulu 
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(SSN 718), Commodore of Submarine Development Squadron 12 (CSDS 12 or 
DEVRON 12) in Groton, CT, and most recently serving in a dual-hatted position as 
Commander, Submarine Group Eight and Commander, Submarines, Allied Naval Forces 
South.166 
As fortune would have it five months after Josh published his white paper, 
VADM Richardson took over the position of COMSUBFOR for the Navy. During the 
weeks leading up to his assumption of command, Richardson met with the CEO of 
Google, at the company’s Mountain View, CA headquarters. An anecdote, as relayed by 
Scott Tupper at a few removes from the origin of the story, about the meeting describes it 
as follows:  During the meeting, Admiral Richardson was asked what problems he was 
having. The admiral responded with a specific need. Twenty minutes later a developer 
had returned with complete and functional app meeting the admiral’s needs167. The 
admiral would subsequently be quoted as saying that with no training “he could get up to 
speed on what was happening using Google Earth in less than three hours,” and that 
submarine systems should capitalize on these types of commercial technologies to reduce 
training requirements and speed a sailor’s development of tactical situational 
awareness.168   
In May of 2011, Admiral Richardson spoke to the Submarine Technology 
Symposium held in Laurel, MD, at APL. He posed to the group a comparison between an 
iPad and the way the submarine community handles contact management. He asked why 
the community “builds things foreign to our customers.”169 Richardson stated that the 
younger sailors are familiar with systems like the X-Box, iPhones and iPads, and asked 
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why the military should disregard that previous training in favor of retraining the users on 
less intuitive systems.170   
The Admiral’s Motivation and Direction 
On a post-TANG blog, the admiral posed the problem as follows, to include 
figures 1 and 2 and their captions: 
Most Sailors entering the Navy can pick up a smartphone and handle it 
like an ace.  They are familiar with the icons and display modes of the new 
apps and games that deliver a tremendous amount of complexity in an 
intuitive interface and system design.  We want to bring that into our 
combat systems and take advantage of all the experience and “training” 
that our Submariners have when they first arrive.   
 
Figure 1 “In short, we want to go from screens that look like this:171“ 
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Figure 2 “To screens that look more like this:172“ 
Around the same time, Richardson posed the problem of leveraging this free 
“training” of the “millennial generation” of sailors and officers.173  This idea resonated 
with CAPT William Merz, the current Commodore of DEVRON 12, the job previously 
held by Admiral Richardson. The mission of DEVRON 12 is to develop, evaluate and 
disseminate tactics to the fleet.174 
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Commodore Merz scheduled a meeting with the submarine force’s development 
community to discuss methods of leveraging the millennials.175  John Stapleton, Pete 
Scala, the Integrated Weapon System Advanced Development Director, and Scott Tupper 
delivered Josh Smith’s white paper to the Commodore as an option to meet the admiral’s 
challenge.176  The plan had already moved to incorporate the entire watch team.177  
The watch team is composed of JOs and enlisted Fire Control Technicians and 
Sonar Technicians. The Fire Control Technicians are responsible for the maintenance and 
operation of combat control and tactical computer systems. The Sonar Technicians are 
responsible for developing sonar tracks to aide in safely navigating the boat and engaging 
enemy vessels. 
The name for the event was still JOIT however until a better name could be 
arrived at. By all accounts, the admiral liked the proposal, and along with a few other 
ideas ordered that DEVRON 12 and APL move ahead with the idea. The admiral also 
recommended that an effort be made to develop the involvement of large private 
organizations such as Microsoft, Adobe, Cisco and Google.178 
Based on Richardson’s orders and recommendations, the APL personnel, Josh 
Smith and Don Noyes, started planning for a Junior Officers Innovation and Technology 
(JOIT) Forum. The forum was to use a format that would eventually be adopted for use at 
TANG. The plan was for several smaller teams guided by facilitators to brainstorm and 
then rapidly and inexpensively prototype their ideas. The prototype artists were originally 
to have been provided by APL or to have been hired separately. To create an air of 
excitement and purpose, the JOIT planning team discussed the wearing of civilian attire, 
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gift bags, command coins and a social hour to get the participants familiar with one 
another prior to the forum.179 
1. Cold Calls to Industry 
To facilitate APB innovation and leverage American industry capabilities, a series 
of “cold calls” to representatives of industry leading corporations was planned. The 
proposed list of corporations to approach via a cold call included: 3M, Google, Microsoft 
(with a focus on their touch table) and EA Sports, a sports video game developer. The 
group also considered attempts to connect with universities such as Penn State, Carnegie 
Mellon and MIT.180  Josh and the team planning the forum at APL already had 
connections with Sonalysts, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin that would be 
leveraged after the forum.181 
The first call was to Corning, a maker of glass products including a multi-touch 
surface glass. This call lead Corning to connect APL, the APB, and those working to set 
the innovation forum up with a much larger network of potential supporters for the 
forum. During the initial conversation, the APL representative, B.M., was told that his 
timing was excellent. Wendell Weeks, the CEO of Corning, had told Paul Tompkins, his 
Director of Commercial Technology, to “Go find something patriotic to do.”182  An 
added benefit of the introduction to Corning was the idea of “fast following.”183  A term 
they defined as being agile with respect to time, and rapidly correcting an organization’s 
technology investments to track or follow changes being made by the technological 
leaders.184 
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While intended to support the APB, this and other cold calls would lead to direct 
support for the forum, soon to have its name changed to TANG Forum. That word, forum 
vice conference, was actually a key consideration. It was felt by the TANG Forum 
supporters that forum was much more inclusive by nature than a conference would be. In 
a conference, the emphasis is not on participation – “a parade of briefs.”185  This was not 
intended to induce spectatorship. This was to be experiential. Unfortunately, at this point, 
even with the backing of the admiral, TANG was still far from a certainty.186   
The unexpectedly positive results of this first call built confidence within the 
ranks of the forum supporters. Their next call was to Microsoft to see if they would be 
interested in working with the APB developers and participating in the TANG Tech 
Expo. The company immediately said yes. This and several other follow-on technology 
demonstrations served to awaken the team to what Josh, Don and John eventually took to 
calling, “the art of the possible.”187  That term would go on to be embraced and 
appreciated by all those who came into contact with the forum. It was told to the 
researchers by several interviewees that these expos, along with the design process itself, 
helped to ignite a fire of imagination within the participants. 
In the end, several large technology companies would support the forum. 
Microsoft, InDepth Engineering Solutions and METRON, an engineering and scientific 
consultancy respectively, agreed to participate in the TANG Forum. VADM Richardson 
described the financial impacts for a company like Microsoft for their participation with 
the APB and TANG in his post-TANG brief to the Junior Leader Innovation Symposium:  
It’s round-off noise to these companies… Corning hosted a seminar at 
Stanford. We didn’t have any solutions, but the submarine community did 
have a pretty interesting problem for them, if they wanted to help us solve 
it. As I said they were all pretty eager to help… Microsoft spent 8.6 billion 
dollars last year on R&D. IBM, Cisco and Google spent billions and 
billions, and they’re willing to share the results with us… 
                                                 
185 Joshua D. Smith and Donald Noyes, Email with Microsoft Word document clarifying several 
points with respect to TANG. September 16, 2012. 
186 Ibid. 
187 John Stapleton, interview by Thomas Hall. TANG Thesis Research Interview (August 8, 2012). 
53 
 
In contrast, the admiral described the DoD as not having “a blank slate or an 
unlimited budget. We have to concentrate on those ideas that provide the biggest bang for 
the buck.”188  None of the companies involved asked for or expected anything in return 
for their participation. Obviously, Microsoft and the other industry participants in TANG 
were not in this to pad their bottom lines.   
While John Stapleton was conducting cold calls to the technology industry, 
another APL executive offered to connect those working to coordinate TANG with an 
individual in the technology industry. This was a person known to have exceptional skills 
at managing innovation. Importantly, he was a known quantity because the APL 
executive had worked with him previously. 
The individual was former Walt Disney Imagineer and Executive, Dr. Eric 
Haseltine. Haseltine met with Josh and the rest of the APL team at the Washington Navy 
Yard. Josh told this researcher that Haseltine’s answer was, “You want to have guys 
prototype things fast and see what works and fail often so that you can figure out what is 
the right solution… You need to tap into industrial design or industrial engineering, and 
he dropped IDEO’s name and said, ‘You really need to get in touch with these guys.’”189   
IDEO 
IDEO is a “global design consultancy” that seeks to “create impact through 
design.”190  While IDEO does work on products and their design, the core of their work 
and their philosophy is to utilize “design thinking” to create human-centered, innovative 
answers to needs and support for behaviors. Their approach to design is based on 
empathy with, and ethnographic research into, the culture of the group they are designing 
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for, and they strive to make their process more personal through this as opposed to a 
running systems discussion.191 
H. THE IDEO SHOPPING CART VIDEO 
As a first step, Josh Smith and John Stapleton searched the Internet. The first 
video result returned is a 1999 ABC Nightline clip in which the IDEO design team is 
challenged to update the ubiquitous shopping cart using the company’s design thinking 
process.192  Josh and John showed the video to nearly every member of their portion of 
APL’s Undersea Warfare Business Area. IDEO Partner David Haygood sums up the 
opinions of the video in an e-mail to Professor Frank Barrett of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, “Almost EVERYBODY loves the Nightline video and sees tons of applicability 
for their situation.” He goes on to say, ”There is a thread thru this whole case about 
overcoming adversity.  This is just one anecdote.  As you have seen, almost everybody 
loves the Nightline video and sees tons of applicability for their situation.  This reaction 
is extremely rare.”  Haygood, whose corporate bio includes, among other things, serving 
as a “U.S. Army Combat Photographer in Vietnam, leading chapel services in a 
maximum security prison, and swimming from Alcatraz to San Francisco” serves as the 
“point of contact for government and public policy programs” described the negative 
reaction as he had heard it, “the design opportunity was nearly derailed by the video.”193   
The usual reaction to the shopping cart video is along the lines of what Josh Smith 
and Don Noyes had experienced, “When Don and I watched the video, we were intrigued 
by how much was accomplished in one full day and the process at which the research, 
brainstorming, and prototyping was conducted.”194  John Stapleton had one of the 
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stronger reactions to the video. In an effort to shift his self-described negative mindset 
based on the video, he called Bill Mahoney. This is the phone call as recollected by John: 
I really don’t know what these IDEO guys are going to do for us, and we 
need for this TANG thing to work.  Look at the shopping cart video. Name 
one grocery store you’ve been to that has adopted that design. Safeway 
and Giant haven’t.  Even trend-setting stores like Whole Foods and 
Wegman’s use regular old shopping carts. Why?  Well, it’s like George 
[another TANG plankholder] explained to me.  A regular shopping cart 
has stood the test of time and is very robust - a large basket on wheels can 
do all sorts of big and small jobs.  The IDEO shopping cart is very 
specialized for shoppers who want a few small items here and there. And 
where do you put the kids?  Also, the notion that the IDEO team comes in 
as outsiders, with no subject matter expertise, to help a team think outside 
the box, just doesn’t hold up for the shopping cart example.  Everyone has 
used a shopping cart and everyone is a subject matter expert, including the 
IDEO team. So why do we think IDEO is really who they say they 
are?”195 
 
Why was John so skeptical of IDEO’s suitability?  He later stated that this 
skepticism likely evolves from his test and analysis engineering background. John also 
pointed out the similarity of this trait to the balance between ship’s safety and risk that 
the nuclear submarine crews he works to support must strike in order to conduct their 
missions, and that “It is an essential skill for those purposes, but as IDEO helped us 
understand, it isn’t particularly helpful at the onset of an innovation effort.”196  This 
reaction to an anthropology heavy design process is much less surprising in light of 
remarks made by IDEO’s General Manager, Tom Kelly, at Creativity World Forum 2008 
in which he stated that it took him a while to get used to the presence of the 
anthropologists that arrived en mass at IDEO in 1991.197   
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Bill Mahoney’s response during the phone call, as told by John, “He told me to 
get out of my dark place and make it work.  And I did, probably mostly because I wanted 
to support Josh.”198  John was now going to give IDEO an opportunity to impress, but 
was clearly still skeptical of their participation. 
Mahoney then placed the cold call to IDEO’s New York office. The result was a 
trip to APL by David Haygood for a face-to-face meeting to discuss what APL and the 
submarine forces were looking for.199  What followed was a larger meeting with 
Haygood, Josh Smith, Bill Mahoney and John Stapleton to set a tentative schedule and 
start work on getting approval to hire IDEO and issue their designers the required 
clearances on 16 August 2011. The results of this meeting were profound for Stapleton. 
In his words, “We had a great first meeting with IDEO.  They were completely 
unpretentious, they were very confident about what they could and couldn’t do, very 
willing to learn about our problem space, and very interested in a partnership that played 
to everyone’s strengths.”200  Stapleton had seen the potential of the contributions that 
IDEO could make and was now a convert. He later became one of the most vocal 
supporters, not just of TANG, which he had always supported, but now also of IDEO’s 
design thinking involvement. The issue of the shopping cart video did receive more 
discussion however. John Stapleton and Josh Smith subsequently pointed out to David 
Haygood that a video of IDEO conducting their design process for a more technical 
customer might have made the comparison easier to draw for APL.201   
While this coordination was ongoing, Admiral Richardson was continuing to 
make his push for innovation and leveraging the talents that the millennials show up to 
boot camp and officer candidate school with. These coordination efforts however, were at 
such an early stage that they were proceeding without the formal backing of the admiral. 
It was all happening so fast that the Admiral had not yet heard about the involvement of 
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IDEO or the rapid progress of industry partners supporting the forum.202  This left him 
unaware that there were new developments in the innovation effort he was fostering for a 
period. The admiral embraced the IDEO effort immediately upon hearing of it, but 
possibly due to this temporary disconnect, the proponents of the forum would meet with 
resistance throughout the process.   
Dissatisfaction 
The fleet had long been anxious about the changes put forth every other year by 
the APB process. The APB program had initially been releasing new systems annually 
from APB99–04.203  The submarine commanders felt that they were left with the 
responsibility of having to train sailors on systems that the training community within the 
submarine forces could not keep up with. The training community focused on the newer 
systems on the boats, but there were typically at least three different systems to be found 
at the waterfront at any one time. Over time, the APB came to agree with the 
commander’s feelings on the issue, and they began to consider where the balance lie 
between technological advancement and proficiency of the watch teams.204  To rectify 
this issue, several releases were skipped, and starting with APB 09, the program released 
updates biannually and a COTS based trainer was incorporated into the APB to ensure 
trainer currency.205  
These feelings would carry over to TANG as well, and they manifested in several 
manners. Criticisms revolved around, “What good outputs do you expect from a bunch of 
JOs and enlisted?”206  This researcher was unable to discuss this sentiment directly with 
any of the resistors. Several interviewees put forth that quote as having come from 
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multiple unnamed sources of resistance. This researcher feels that quotes of that nature 
likely stemmed from a perceived threat to the speakers’ position or sense of identity.   
At least two of those who did not fully support the initiative, did so out of a stated 
sense of caution. That cautious nature is a product of their “do no harm” safety mantra. 
This then is the “creeping nuke-ism” in action.207  
Others felt that this type of innovation effort would not be a good fit for the 
corporate climate of the submarine forces given the need to meet stringent engineering 
requirements aboard the boats. Almost to a man, these people would over time become 
converts and even serve as evangelists for the program. As meetings were held to train 
subject matter experts for the forum, more people would be invited to the IDEO led 
brainstorming sessions. The typical reaction to seeing the design thinking process in 
action live was an enthusiastic embrace of the design initiative and the conversion to 
design advocate.208 
Advocates for TANG would have to confront these feelings of dissatisfaction 
along the path to the forum and in order to bring the forum’s outputs to the fleet. One 
thing that most participants of this research agree on however is that none of the resistors 
were malicious or had other than the best intentions and needs of the Navy at heart. It was 
a situation viewed from numerous perspectives that provoked differing reactions based 
on the realities of each individual in question.   
I. JOIT TO TANG 
No one interviewed knows exactly when it happened, but at some point between 
16 June and 17 August 2011, the name was changed from JOIT Forum to TANG forum 
due to leadership with the name. Commodore Merz of CSDS 12 came up with a new 
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name:  TANG.209 The new name served two purposes aside from simply replacing JOIT. 
The new name encompassed the enlisted participation that the old name failed to address. 
The TANG moniker also provided the forum with a historical connection for the 
participants. The USS Tang (SS-306) was a highly decorated submarine during World 
War II. During the boat’s five deployments, it was credited with sinking 33 enemy 
ships.210  The new name just made sense and added to the experience for all participants. 
On 17 August, Josh Smith had a conversation with a Microsoft representative at 
which the company formally agreed to deliver a presentation of new possibilities during a 
“technology expo” for the TANG Forum, and on 20 September, their schedule was 
finalized. 
1. IDEO’s Research 
On 1 September 2011, the clearances were received for IDEO’s team of designers 
to participate in TANG. Typically, an IDEO design team must develop the brief they are 
given by a client to a higher level of abstraction. For instance, in an exercise given to a 
class at NPS, the initial request was to “get people to recycle their plastic bags.”  This 
was then changed to a more abstract “raise community awareness of recycling 
opportunities.”  This was not required for TANG. The brief given to IDEO was that the 
submarine community wanted to improve the situational awareness of the watch team. 
Situational awareness in this context was with regard to the location and type of sonar 
contacts being tracked by the boat’s control room watch team. VADM Richardson 
provided the constraint. He wanted to leverage the innate technological knowledge of the 
young people.211 
From 7–9 and 14–16 September, IDEO conducted research interviews, toured 
Lockheed Martin observing APB11 testing, and received a tour of a nuclear submarine. 
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During the same period, the IDEO team refined their interview methodology, and 
provided training to those selected as subject matter experts (SMEs – spelled out by 
IDEO and CSDS 12 personnel, but said as a word by most of the Navy participants) on 
the IDEO method of brainstorming. It was agreed on by those interviewed that IDEO’s 
interview methods were effective. One of those interviewed stated, “You got me to talk 
about a lot of stuff.”212  Others stated during interviews for this research that the IDEO 
researchers would let a lull in conversation continue. Each individual then felt compelled 
to comment to fill the conversational void.213 
One of the goals of the research was to make observations regarding the way in 
which the submariners interacted with their systems and to make note of any quotes that 
seemed especially telling about the human aspects of the submarine forces and their 
systems. Dan Soltzberg, who lead the research, stated that the specifics of each interview 
were “similar to jazz improv” and therefore difficult to reconstruct in specific detail, but 
the purpose was to  
understand what was working for people in the current context of their 
experiences in the sub force, and what was not working. To understand 
these points, we uncover people’s actions, motivations, the technological 
and spatial context in which they’re working, the immediate interpersonal 
dynamics of their work, and factors of the larger organization such as 
training that might impact their experience. While we go into our research 
interviews with a structured set of questions, the actual interviews are 
similar to jazz improv in that we maintain a high degree of flexibility 
around both topics and methods. We will often follow the conversation 
where it leads, as our goal is to discover factors we didn’t necessarily go 
into the conversation knowing to look for. 214   
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The observations and quotes obtained during the research were then evaluated to 
refine future interviews and to uncover insights into which needs design thinking could 
be applied to in order to support the watch team.215   
The following are some examples of quotes the IDEO team took down during 
their research: 
• “I know the information exists, but I don’t know how to get at it.” 
• “If the system was smart enough to know what I need and don’t need, I 
would be happy. “  
• “Drill down as I need/want to (through the track data).” 
• “I’d like to have some history of those things I’ve learned (regarding 
training).”216 
From this, the IDEO team developed the following observation, “Info is 
everywhere; it’s hard to pull it all together. There’s no common format. Need to be able 
to see partial layers, not everything.”217 
Selecting SMEs 
During this early phase, a second crucial portion of IDEO’s ethnographic research 
work involved conducting interviews to determine an individual’s suitability to be a SME 
for TANG. IDEO, APL and DEVRON 12 gave serious consideration to which people 
were suitable for the job. The SME would be more than just a source of engineering 
knowledge for the design sessions. The SME was responsible, with the help of IDEO 
facilitators, for guiding the design thinking process of the TANG participants toward a 
personal and human discussion, and away from a systems discussion. They needed to be 
able to do that without interfering with the brainstorming sessions unnecessarily or in a 
heavy-handed manner.218  Several of the SMEs later said that the hardest part was 
“holding (their) thoughts and ideas while facilitating.”219 
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Lieutenant Tim Manke, a TANG attendee, described the SME’s role as “a matter 
of finding the right question to ask, and then asking it based on “How might we’s.”  
Equally important according to Manke was creating an environment in which the 
participants were made comfortable with asking silly questions without repercussions.220   
Rumors of sailors and JOs being interviewed for a chance to shape the future of 
the submarine community filtered down to the waterfront in Groton, CT. LT Josh 
Hausbach sought out the source of these rumors in an effort to learn more. Hausbach 
would eventually serve as a TANG SME.   
The design team was specifically looking for people they considered “T-
shaped.”221  In an interview, Dan Soltzberg described the IDEO version of T-shaped as 
being someone with a deep knowledge of at least one subject, a broad base of more 
generalizable knowledge and experience, and a sense of empathy that the person could 
bring to bear on the human-centric nature of any design issue.222 
During the SME selection process, there was one person who did not appear to fit 
the T-shaped description. The individual was a prior enlisted submariner now that now 
worked as a civilian supporting the submarine community in several areas. Those 
conducting the interview felt he was quiet, withdrawn and negative about the process.223  
When interviewed later as part of this research, he said, “I’m not an idea generation 
person. I can take someone else’s ideas and work with them and make them better, but I 
don’t really come up with new ideas.”  Those feelings likely colored his interactions 
during the interviews. Interestingly, during the course of the rest of the interview, this 
researcher and a co-researcher took note of at least three very original and intelligent 
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ideas that this individual had recently developed. The ideas were helping to transform 
training for the betterment of the submarine forces. It appears that the individual had just 
never thought of himself as an innovator before, and was uncomfortable with the role.224 
J. DESIGN THINKING AS A FRACTAL 
Throughout the process, IDEO used their design thinking methodology in a fractal 
fashion to develop the design sessions they were supporting at TANG. In a group 
interview with the IDEO design team that worked with the TANG participants to 
facilitate design thinking, David Haygood, Dave Blakely, Dan Soltzberg, and Peter 
Macdonald, the team’s internal planning processes were discussed. They indicated that at 
each point where the plan for TANG pivoted or altered, the team relied upon the same 
design thinking process that they provided to the submarine forces customers. When it 
came to designing the design sessions for TANG, there was a brainstorming session 
followed by selection and prototyping. 225  
The IDEO team brought this approach with them to several planning meetings in 
an APL basement office where the activities for the three days of the TANG Forum were 
laid out. Two people attended the first meeting from APL, Josh Smith and Don Noyes, 
along with two people from IDEO, Dave Blakely and Dan Soltzberg. The use of the 
design thinking process in this initial planning meeting surfaced good themes for 
investigation at TANG, but also served to convince Josh and Don of the value that IDEO 
was capable of bringing to the submarine community. From this meeting onward, Josh 
and Don would bring in more people to the planning meetings to spread the experience 
with IDEO.226 
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K. TANG DRY RUN 
With any first run exercise or event, there are likely to be problems encountered 
and issues to be resolved. Using the same design thinking process, it was decided to stage 
a dry run to serve as a prototype. The dry run would hopefully surface any of those likely 
problems and issues while there was still time for them to be dealt with. The dry run 
would be held in Groton, CT given its convenient location for the Commodore and 
DEVRON staff and many of the SMEs. It also provided a ready source of participants for 
the prototype event.   
On 20 September 2011, nine officers and sailors were recruited from the boats at 
the waterfront. The goal was to conduct a small-scale experiment with the proposed 
design session by asking the nine dry run participants to brainstorm, prototype, and 
generally go through the design thinking process.227  Initially, most of the participants 
were skeptical of the exercise. They had received no prior notice of the event, nor were 
they told by their commands what to expect. One especially grim individual arrived 
thinking he was there to help write a tactical manual.228  There were several comments 
along the lines of “What can we do?” and “Nobody will listen to us.”   
By the end of the event, most of the participants were converts who had enjoyed 
the process and felt they had positively contributed to the session. The person that arrived 
expecting to rewrite a tactical manual was quoted as saying, “This is way cool, how can I 
participate and be selected,” on his way out.229  The IDEO design team took note of the 
outputs and held onto them in the event that those ideas, or some that they had developed 
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in their own brainstorming sessions, might be needed to seed the brainstorming session of 
the TANG Forum in November.230 
One element of the dry run was a graphic of the Virginia control room layout and 
a tape outline of the spatial constraints that any prototyped idea would have to conform to 
as stated by VADM Richardson. Richardson explained these limits during a subsequent 
keynote address to a Junior Leader Innovation Symposium in June of 2012. His stated 
constraint was that the submarine would not grow in size. The hatches would not grow in 
size. If the system did not fit down an existing hatch or into the volume of current 
submarine hulls, then it did not meet his requirements.231  
Based on the results of the dry run, it was decided by IDEO and APL that a more 
substantial version of the model would be required. In the lead up to TANG, IDEO 
constructed an outline model of a Virginia class nuclear submarine to guide the 
participant’s design thinking based on constraints.232 
Another element of the dry run was the plenary room. Given the level of interest 
by Admiral Richardson and the Commodore, it was expected that others would want to 
observe the process. The plenary room was there for those who wanted to observe the 
IDEO led dry run from another room so as to not disturb the junior personnel during the 
design session. There was an audio and video feed into the room so that the observers 
could follow along with the brainstorming and prototyping throughout the day. Sources 
vary as to whether the plenary room was much used during the dry run, but it was 
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decided to have a more substantial plenary room capacity for TANG in any event.233  
The more substantial version of the room was to be run as a fully active and engaged 
process for the senior leadership in attendance. This was done due to the IDEO team’s 
impression that it would be easier for the leadership group to develop a sense of what was 
going on in the design room and where the eventual outputs came from if they took part 
in the process.234 
Several other changes were proposed based on the results of the dry run. It was 
recommended that after the first day design session, that the SMEs and facilitators guide 
the participants toward a focus on the boat’s displays rather than wholesale control room 
reconfiguration. TANG participants would be provided with a better selection of 
prototyping tools and aides for demonstrating what the equipment was and how it should 
behave to the SMEs. The design team also decided that the structure of the control room 
mock-up could be used as a stage for the groups of TANG participants to perform skits in 
support of their prototype’s functionality.235  Finally, the dry run allowed the design 
facilitators and SMEs to refine the questions used to guide the design process for 
TANG.236 
The dry run was deemed a success. It had served as an excellent low-cost 
experiment in which the APL and IDEO coordinators of TANG were able to test most of 
their design session ideas, the agenda, the way in which the spatial constraints were 
displayed and the manner of involvement of interested observers.237  A further benefit 
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was brought about by the similar training and experience levels of the dry run participants 
to the proposed participants for TANG. 
Another significant benefit of the dry run came from the brainstorming 
output. Because the participants in the dry run were similar to the 
participants for TANG, the IDEO/APL team gained a subjective 
understanding of how the team would respond to synthesis, brainstorming, 
and prototyping activities. This allowed the team to tune the workshop 
materials for TANG. 
Possibly the biggest benefit was that once again, the majority of those who might 
have otherwise been resistors were persuaded by what they saw that the design thinking 
process could work for their community. This is effectively shown by their desire to 
participate in the actual TANG event in November.238  As mentioned previously, even a 
naturally creative person like Ray Rowland, who was described by Don Noyes as “He 
does a lot of stuff really out of the box, some very crazy display concepts. They called 
him the mad scientist,” had concerns about the IDEO process239. Don ultimately 
convinced him through his conduct of the dry run session. Don had served as the 
facilitator during the dry run; Don simply stuck to IDEO’s brainstorming rules and 
insisted that the participants did too.240  These recent converts to the design thinking 
cause were given IDEO’s version of a command coin. The brass coins read, “Brainstorm 
Qualified.”241 
Even after conversion some of the new supporters required further proof. They 
wanted to know WHY it worked.  “It works, we grant you that…explain to me why.242“  
The IDEO team had never had anyone ask that question before, so they returned to their 
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offices and compiled academic research that showed why it worked.243  Thus prepared, 
they not only gave it to those who had asked, they kept it on hand to provide to those who 
were certain to ask for it during TANG.244 
In a post-dry run conversation, one of the facilitators stated that the one day, 
eight-person event “exceeded my expectations.”  The individual also felt that despite the 
fact that the eight people had come into the event without any previous introduction to 
design thinking or what they would be doing that day, they had come up with a wealth of 
ideas, and that he was confident that there would be “no shortage of ideas for TANG 
itself.”245  From IDEO’s perspective, “Ideas are endless; there is no scarcity.”  They also 
saw little difference in the way they needed to engage the nuclear navy as compared to 
other large scale, hierarchical organizations. While they felt it was a more technical realm 
with very smart group of clients, their design thinking approach is more concerned with 
achieving an understanding of the humans involved in the process. The one difference 
that stood out for the IDEO team was clean up at the end of the day. Corporate clients 
“are usually checking their watch by five o’clock,” but the sailors and officers “cleaned 
up in two-point-five minutes and were ready to go.”246 
Selecting Participants 
In the background throughout this period, Commodore Merz and the DEVRON 
12 staff were working to select the right participants from the fleet for the forum. The 
Commodore and the APL staff had agreed that the DEVRON should select their own 
participants. Their goal was to develop a good cross section of the submarine community 
for the event. The result: 
Another little funny side story, we sent out the request to get junior 
officers. One squadron came back and said, “All my junior officers are too 
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busy, but I can give you my department heads.”  I am like; “That doesn’t 
make any sense. Why would your department heads have more free time 
than your junior officers?  We don’t want anybody. Thank you very 
much.”  But that is the culture. Don’t send the JOs. Next. So the good 
cross-section from across the fleet…  We did have two Petty Officers 3rd 
Class nominated. For a commodore of a squadron, a captain to think that 
his Petty Officer 3rd Class is the most creative and dynamic and innovative 
guy in the squadron, that is a big deal. So when the names came in and 
DEVRON picked them, he is like; “We have got an FT 3.”  I am like, “He 
has to come. I have to see who this guy is.”  Who was he?  He was the guy 
with the hat on in the video, the guy with the glasses from Super Bad. So 
all walks of life with that one. So we had two FT 3s and I started asking 
myself, “When is it anytime that a 3rd Class gets heard on anything to 
change the future?  Ever?” 
One SME, summed it up, “I don’t want someone who hasn’t been to sea, because 
then you don’t understand what the physical problem is out there. But, I did want young 
kids, because you can look at my daughter with an iPhone. Those came out just a few 
years ago, it seems, and it’s amazing what she can do with it, how quick she can figure it 
out. So, I wanted the young kids… And, it’s also possible that I felt like when I was a 
lieutenant, back in APB ‘98, I had lots of ideas, and there was no way to gain 
traction.”247 
One of the ‘young kids’ at TANG was a young Petty Officer Second Class from 
the USS Virginia. The Petty Officer had been told by his commanding officer that he was 
selected for the forum specifically because he “questions everything.”  The Petty Officer 
said he experienced immediate jealousy onboard the boat over a week in sunny San 
Diego. He also said that the jealousy was even greater when he, upon his return, 
described to his shipmates what he had been doing there and “how much fun I had.”248 
The Run Up to TANG 
During the four weeks between the dry run and TANG’s opening remarks, the 
TANG team, including APL, DEVRON, IDEO and the SMEs, worked to refine their 
requirements for a successful TANG, their insights to focus the TANG brainstorming 
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sessions and the overall agenda. The IDEO design team uncovered nine insights into the 
submarine force’s needs based on their ethnographic research. These nine insights were 
then grouped into three “clusters.”  For instance, the second cluster was, “Building 
Shared Understanding,” and within that cluster the first insight was, “The majority of 
incidents stem from a breakdown in shared mental model.”  Each insight has one quote 
that highlights the relevance of the insight. In this case, the quote, from a Sonar 
Technician, was, “All the info’s in there, but we’re not doing a good job of getting it out 
there onto the surfaces.”249  Based on the insights report, Dan Soltzberg, a designer from 
the IDEO team, was told, “You guys came in, and in two weeks articulated what we’ve 
been trying to articulate for a decade.”250 
Josh Smith and Don Noyes, used this interim period for most of the logistics of 
getting officers and enlisted to San Diego and coordinating the rooms and busses. Given 
the level of effort required to make TANG happen, most of those interviewed referred to 
this as Josh and Don’s project. Scott Tupper said, “Josh was the ringleader on this.”251 
A week prior to the start of TANG, on 1 November 2011, Commodore Merz sent 
an e-mail to the selected participants for TANG. The e-mail started with, “Hello TANG 
participants!”  The Commodore then congratulated them for being selected to participate 
in the inaugural TANG forum, stated that he was looking forward to speaking with them, 
his motivations for supporting TANG, and then explained what the participants could 
expect the following week in San Diego. The e-mail told the participants that they would 
receive a technology demonstration by Microsoft and other industry leaders to help 
define the “art of the possible.”  Finally, the Commodore concluded with four thoughts 
for the selected participants, 
• Next week will be unlike any military event you’ve been through before. 
• Next week there are no wrong answers. 
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• Next week there are no uniforms. 
• Next week is about new ideas. 
No clearer message that they were in for something different could have been sent 
to the participants prior to their arrival.252 
On 6 November 2011, Dan and Peter from IDEO drove into San Diego from Palo 
Alto carrying IDEO’s toolkit for the event. The toolkit included everything that the 
facilitators and SMEs would need during the three-day forum. On Monday, as David 
Haygood and Dave Blakely arrived, the IDEO team worked to assemble the PVC pipe 
control room mock-up, rearranged the furniture of the Submarine Learning Center 
Detachment, San Diego, and distributed the ever-present Post-It notes. Afterward, they 
met up with the TANG SMEs and participants that evening for a round of introductions 
and a social hour. 
Much thought had been given to the design of the conduct of the forum, too. San 
Diego’s Gaslamp Quarter had been chosen for quartering to give the forum a sense of 
occasion and to charge the minds of the participants to expect big things from the trip. 
Since they were staying in the Gaslamp, no rental cars were provided. The thinking was 
that, “There is plenty of entertainment right there. It reduces the potential for DUIs to 
zero, and the lack of rental costs covers the difference in hotels and the cost of the 
busses.”253   
At the airport, there were “Welcome” signs pointing to the TANG bus pick-up 
where the busses were waiting to take the participants to their hotel. The Hilton. TANG 
was designed to be an experience. That is what IDEO’s version of design is about. 
According to Josh, every time a sailor was dropped off at the hotel, he heard,  
“‘Are you kidding me?’  I am like, ‘The BOQ (Bachelor Officer Quarters) 
was packed, so we couldn’t put you in there.’  Although some people—
this gets to the dynamics, the people when we were trying to set this thing 
up were like, “Just put them out in the BOQ down by 32nd Street, on down 
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there with the local guys.” What is the experience they are going to have 
of the whole forum?  They are part of the team from the minute they get 
off the plane. They matter. One of the comments was when we were 
dropping them off on the way out they said, “You guys are awesome. You 
thought of everything.”254 
The participants were told not to pack a uniform. They would be in civilian 
clothes for the duration in order to “break out of the sub culture.”  This was done to 
remove the barriers to the effective flow of communication that the rank structure of most 
any military unit would otherwise impose.  
If you are a fast attack guy, think Hunt for Red October, the USS Dallas, 
they do the cool missions off the coast or whatever, blah, blah, blah. Then 
there is a boomer guy. So it is like Crimson Tide, where they go and they 
hide and they don’t want to talk to anybody. Their mission is important, 
but there are a lot of dynamics if you are a fast attack guy and a boomer 
guy. So we didn’t want that to happen. So with the civilian clothes you 
don’t look at how many ribbons you have and whatever, so no judgment 
there. Makes the enlisted guys and the officers collaborate more because 
they are all just in civilian clothes. And, it’s comfortable. Some guy with a 
hat, best dressed, hands down, guy with the funky hat.   
This was all done outside of the Defense Travel System (DTS) to reduce the 
burden to the participant. The junior sailor or officer was only responsible for arriving in 
San Diego.255 
That evening at the introductions, the participants were given patches 
corresponding to World War II submarines and divided into teams according to which 
boat they wore the patch of. Each participant was also given a TANG “command coin” 
similar to what a commanding officer presents a sailor with at the end of a tour aboard a 
naval vessel. These coins were highly coveted by the recipients, with numerous senior 
officers requesting them as well. What most didn’t know is that the Navy and APL 
supply systems would not approve the purchase of command coins for the forum. Josh 
Smith paid for the coins out of his own pocket with no reimbursement. This was all done 
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in the name of creating the appropriate experience for the TANG participants, and the 
story is this:256 
Now the funny thing about the coin was Commodore Merz, he saw the 
coin because his right hand man is like, (Commodore:) “So, I should have 
brought something for these guys.”  (Executive Assistant: ) “You mean 
like this coin?”  (Commodore: )”He’s like where did this come from?”  
(Executive Assistant: ) “Josh bought them.”  He (the Commodore) goes, 
calls back east, has his chief of staff overnight all of his coins from his 
command and the next day he goes and hands them out… awesome. So 
people get it. You just have got to inspire them and say “Yes this is 
important.”  Spend the money out of my own pocket. People chipped in to 
help cover it, which is fine, and even if they didn’t it would be fine. 
Because when I hand that coin to that petty officer, he is like, “This is 
awesome.”  Now everyone wants a coin and I am out of coins, but you 
know it matters. They matter, and that is the big thing. And they even said 
that they actually have a voice and that they matter.   
L. THE TANG FORUM 
On the morning of 7 November 2011, TANG kicked off with a Video 
Teleconference message from VADM Richardson to the TANG participants to urge them 
to take part in the brainstorming to come as a way to facilitate the submarine force’s fast 
following of industry technology.257  Commodore Merz provided guidance as well. He 
instructed the JOs and sailors not to look at the mundane aspects like reliability. Instead, 
he directed that they think big.258 
The Tech Expo was held by industry leading corporations such as Microsoft and 
by current APB developers such as METRON and InDepth Engineering on current and 
emerging technologies. A warm-up exercise was held to get the participants thinking 
about these tools and what they knew from their own experience that might be useful in 
the control room. Each of the three groups was given a board and told, “Tell us what 
technologies you are aware of for interactions and things like that. So they started talking 
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about pico projectors and of course iPads and iPhones and Kinect and all that stuff was 
brought up by each room.”259  Based on these thoughts, the groups were then asked 
HOW these technologies might be incorporated into the control room. That’s when they 
were given a set of seven rules by the IDEO design team. 
• Defer Judgment 
• Encourage Wild Ideas 
• Build on the Ideas of Others 
• Stay Focused on Topic 
• One Conversation at a Time 
• Be Visual 
• Go for Quantity 
These are IDEO’s seven rules for brainstorming, and each person present, SMEs 
and participants alike, was given a copy of the rules on a wallet-sized card. These rules 
are painted on the walls of every office space in IDEO’s headquarters in Palo Alto, CA, 
but these are not to be confused with rules for life in general. When asked, Dan Soltzberg 
stated that “Every design session requires judgment be applied at the right points... and 
eventually the quantity needs to be controlled.”260  These then are the rules only for the 
brainstorming portion of a design session.   
The purpose of brainstorming is to develop a divergence of ideas to generate 
possibilities. Dan likened the “different mental construct required during divergence” to a 
“sci-fi film…you have to suspend disbelief for a while.”  The first two rules create a 
fertile breeding ground for the session’s participants. The third rule uses the traditional 
improvisational (improv) “Yes, and…” rule. Nothing kills brainstorming like the word 
no. That comes later. In this stage, say “yes” to what a previous person said, “and…” 
build upon the idea to fashion a newer better idea. Ideas are put forth by sketching them 
onto Post-it notes, supported by a quick, one to two line verbal description and placed 
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onto the board. Regardless of the merit, someone should then be able to work with that 
sketch to produce his or her own sketch, and the cycle continues in the improv 
manner.261   
These rules had an impact upon the SMEs and participants. Months later, 
individuals we interviewed either had their IDEO issued brainstorming card in their 
wallet or said it was tacked to a wall in their office for ready reference. The APL 
personnel in particular said that they now used this process as part of every business 
meeting.262   
Given the heavy reliance on Post-it notes, it is not surprising that IDEO instructed 
facilitators and participants on a particular manner for removing a note from a stack. If a 
note is peeled from a corner, the result is a note with a curled corner that is less likely to 
stick. Instead, it was recommended that a Post-it be removed from its stack by pulling 
down from the center of the bottom of the note.263  Each person then gets an opportunity 
to promote his or her idea to the crowd.264   
Another lesson directed the participants as to how the Post-its were to be used. 
Every time a new group attempts to brainstorming, IDEO conducts training on how to 
use a Post-it. As described by Dan, there are three ways to use a Post-it.  “This is good. 
This is better. This one is the best. And the good one has an idea on it. The better one has 
an idea written really big in Sharpie, and the best one has the name of the idea and a 
sketch.”265  Partially this is to make the Post-it easier to read from across the room, but 
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the sketch also enables other participants to “really quickly ‘grok’” what the creator 
intended.266 
The participants were described as “initially quiet and reserved.”  They may have 
started slow, but by the end of the three days, they would “want to keep going,” and 
“Every idea lead to five more ideas in their heads.”  It was “the first time they felt like 
they had control over the future of their systems.”267 
The field of ideas is then grouped logically, possibly along functional lines, and 
then the groups are subdivided again along similar lines. From this divergent set of ideas, 
the group then works toward convergence. The best ideas were selected by the 
participants from the broad field of ideas generated during brainstorming. This was 
accomplished through voting. Each participant was given a set number of adhesive voting 
dots with which to choose from the field of candidate ideas. The handful of ideas with the 
most voting dots on them were then the starting point for another round of brainstorming 
to refine those ideas. According to Dave Blakely, IDEO’s Director of Technology 
Strategy, “The Navy guys were hilariously good at brainstorming.”268 
At the conclusion of this brainstorming session, the process was repeated until a 
couple of ideas had been selected for prototyping as an advancement of the original 
sketch. The prototypes were made of inexpensive items such as dry erase markers, foam 
core boards, cardboard boxes, tape and hot glue as shown in Figure 3. As the prototype 
was made refinements were added, unnecessary parts discarded. Finally, from among the 
prototypes the most viable were chosen to go forward into experimentation.   
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Figure 3 Participants working on TANG prototypes. 
During this first day, senior leadership was watching from the plenary room that 
had been tested during the dry run. Based on the number of leaders asking, “Why don’t I 
get to do this?” during the dry run and the changes made to include the observers in the 
process, IDEO’s David Haygood sat in on the plenary room sessions and, along with Josh 
Smith, lead the observers through the full brainstorming and prototyping process.269  This 
senior session was briefing, brainstorming, selecting and prototyping to develop a tool, 
plan or business process for implementing the ideas brought forth by the junior personnel 
at TANG.270   
The day ended, as would the next two, with skit based demonstrations of 
prototypes to the TANG Forum meeting as a whole.271  At the end of the first day, most 
of the SMEs and facilitators felt that the ideas has been too systems and reliability 
centric. According to attendees, Commodore Merz addressed the gathering, and told them 
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not to look at reliability, but to instead think big.272  By this he was understood to mean 
that he was looking for new innovations to help with tactical situational awareness aboard 
the boats, and not interested in the engineering of the systems that would come later in 
the development process. 
The participants were bussed back to their hotel in the Gaslamp Quarter of San 
Diego. That evening, three junior sailors were eating pizzas when inspiration struck. 
While looking at the pizza and puzzling over a group of control room displays for fire 
control and sonar data that did not work together to provide track information in one 
location, the idea for a sliding wedge of information to be displayed came to him. Over 
the course of the next several hours, the IDEO process was used on numerous cocktail 
napkins and a pizza box with a SME, Ray Rowland, who had joined them at the table. By 
the end of the night, it had been given a name. It was called Predator due to the similarity 
its appearance shared with the wrist display the alien wore in the 1987 Arnold 
Schwarzenegger action film of the same name. 
The next morning, the idea was presented to the group as a whole as shown in 
Figure 4. Word filtered back to VADM Richardson, who was so impressed with the idea 
that he requested a working prototype of the display.273   Ray called back to his software 
prototype in Groton, CT, to get him working on the project.274 
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Figure 4 TANG participants working on Predator sketch. 
 TANG continued that Wednesday with a schedule change. APL and IDEO 
arrived at the change based on a quick brainstorming session the evening prior. The 
change meant that the three groups, which had been divided up with JOs in one group, 
Sonar Technicians in another and Fire Control Technicians in the third, would remain 
that way until Thursday now.275  It was felt that the teams were making such good 
progress that it was best not to disturb the momentum. 
In the end, the facilitators did not need to seed the groups with ready-made topics 
for brainstorming. An incredible amount of ideas were created at every brainstorming 
session.   
M. TANG OUTPUTS 
By the end of the final day of TANG, four ideas had grabbed attention. The first 
was the Predator display that drastically reduced the time and mental effort required to 
achieve a 90 percent solution on a new track. The second was a 360-degree continuous 
multi-touch display representation of the periscope’s image that numerous people liked, 
but was finally determined to not work within the size constraints of the submarine. Third 
                                                 
275 David Haygood, Dave Blakely and Dan Soltzberg, interview by Professor Frank Barrett and 
Thomas Hall. Designers at IDEO Palo Alto, CA, (August 29, 2012). 
80 
 
was an idea to use Microsoft X-Box controllers to operate the submarine’s periscope 
instead of the more costly and complex system currently in use. This new system is being 
incorporated into the process for APB approval and makes use of the millennial 
generation’s experience with game system controllers to reduce training time for the 
periscope system. 
The fourth idea was Adaptive and Embedded Training, and it appears to be 
headed for the fleet as well. According to some participants, roughly 80 percent of the 
displays in the control room are required to be on a particular screen at any given time. 
The idea that came from TANG was to use the other screens for training while on watch. 
The training, of whichever sort was required by the particular sailor, would be based on 
prior mission recordings, and the training completed would be recorded as a score in the 
same way that a video game will save a score when you exit. That score would then 
degrade over time as currency or proficiency was lost, and the score could travel with the 
sailor from one command to another. This is a revolutionary idea to speed up the training 
process through the use of time and systems that would otherwise be claimed, but 
possibly underutilized.   
TANG concluded with skits performed by the JOs and sailors using the PVC pipe 
control room as their stage. One demonstration was of a tablet-based messaging system. 
To represent the messages being ‘flicked’ from one screen to another, a sailor would snap 
a Post-it out of his hand, and another sailor across the control room would reveal one he 
had palmed at the same time. The IDEO team loved that touch.276   
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These skits were useful to demonstrate the watch team integration role of the new 
ideas. Josh’s description of watching the skits was, “They would act it out and say this is 
how I want to do this. So it is in a physical space, you can build off of the idea and we 
can all visualize what they are trying to do.”  Figure 5 shows this spatial mock up. 
Figure 5 Skit in PVC control room with watch team lead ‘flicking’ information to 
watch stander. 
VADM Richardson received the software-based prototype that he had requested 
on Friday. The prototype development was a quick course in component reuse. The quick 
development was made possible in the main by the fact that most of the software required 
already existed due to Ray’s efforts to engage the current systems aboard the boats.277  
The only real coding required was for Ray’s very talented developer to take a previously 
linear graph and now wrap it around a central point.   
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Ray Rowland had been creating these tools for years, but he and his supporters 
could find no traction for them. Ray’s computer has been described as “the logical 
equivalent of the warehouse at the end of Indiana Jones and the Raiders of the Lost 
Arc.”278  Unfortunately, they were ideas with no stakeholders. Now, the submarine 
community itself had created the demand signal for these tools. Ray rapidly transformed 
the prototype into one capable of running real system data, and within 12 weeks, Predator 
had been prototyped to the level required for testing for inclusion in APB 13.279   
The senior officers, managers and engineers from the plenary room design session 
also presented a deliverable on the final day. It was a mobile innovation lab, and they put 
just as much energy into their pitch as the JOs and sailors. It was delivered to the 
accompaniment of a rap. The product was a “Pimp My Submarine” truck with tools for 
design thinking for the fleet. 
N. POST-TANG RESULTS 
David Haygood had one post-TANG concern based on his years of experience 
with bringing design thinking to large organizations. He used the British term “Mind the 
Gap.”  This term came into British usage in the 1960s and referred to the gap between the 
London Underground train and the platform for waiting passengers. To IDEO, it refers to 
the point at which their contract ends and an organization assumes responsibility for 
maintaining the momentum. If the change hasn’t been given enough time and 
management, it is all too easy for the organization to backslide into their old ways and 
processes.  “Without a persistent voice, something might die on the vine.”280  There is 
hope in this case. David feels that “Josh has now created a large pool of champions for 
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design thinking within the org, but need to connect and maintain the connection between 
the top and the bottom of the org.”281 
Ray Rowland also personally supports this feeling.  “Shortly after TANG I 
thought to myself, ‘At some point this has to stop, right?  At some point I have to go back 
to work. But then I realized it was engrained in our processes and it works.’”282 
Josh and Don maintain contact with as many TANG participants and facilitators 
as possible. They try to monitor the use of design thinking going forward from TANG, 
and in return keep the participants appraised of how Predator and Embedded Training are 
progressing in the APB / TI world.283  Josh and Don are also working on plans to conduct 
TANG with JOs and junior enlisted every two years.284   
TANG outputs were also included in a follow on program to TANG developed by 
Josh and Don. This new event was called, Concept User Experience Events. During a 
Concept User Experience Event, one of the concepts being tested by Lockheed was a web 
browser supported version of the X-Box controller operated periscope concept from 
TANG.285  Young sailors with no knowledge of TANG or the concept and prototype 
were given a chance to use the system.   
They gave them no training what so ever.  ‘Just sit in front of it. You know 
what a periscope does right?  Because you’re a submarine guy. Start 
playing with it.’  So, they started playing with it and clicking. They gave 
them fifteen minutes, I think. Then after the fifteen minutes, they started 
asking them questions like, ‘I want you to do this?’ or, ‘I want you to tell 
me how many contacts there are,’ or, ‘What are they doing?’ interacting 
with it…  But what was neat was that through this process…something 
like 70 percent of the operations they did with no training what-so-ever. 
Afterward, they gave them, no-kidding, ten minutes or less of training to 
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make sure that they could get up to 100 percent, and every one of them, 
five sailors over five days, got 100 percent on the test after the training. 
This is rewarding, and the fun thing is that these things are all defined, and 
we haven’t paid one coder one dime to start developing the system yet. 
When you read the systems engineering and program management books, 
they all say it’s 10 times the savings if you identify the requirements up 
front vice later. So… we should save 10-X because I already know what 
the display should look like. We’ve already received the feedback of little 
tweaks to make it that much better. So when we no-kidding build the 
display, which will start here in the next month, five months from now 
when we test it with sailors and the real system connected I’m feeling 
pretty good about how it will be received.286 
Several months after TANG, in February of 2012, Microsoft flew several APL 
and APB personnel out to Redmond, WA, for a follow up meeting to discuss TANG’s 
results at no cost to APL or the U.S. government. In May of 2012, Microsoft, Adobe, 
Google, Metron, InDepth, Sedna and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) 
participated in the Submarine Technology Symposium.287  The symposium is an annual 
event that brings together the submarine community with industry to broker discussion of 
technology issues within the fleet.288  This represents the first time ever that the 
symposium had commercial industry representation. Adobe, Cisco, Corning, Google and 
Microsoft are all now part of the TANG Tech Team. The APL team maintains its close 
ties with the industry leading technology companies that supported TANG.   
The TANG participants have done their part to carry design thinking into the 
fleet. While underway, a cable onboard a submarine snapped when a sailor bumped into 
it. The normal response tends to be that a Chief tells someone in his shop how it should 
be done. In this case a TANG participant, a Petty Officer, gathered together his division-
mates and walked them through the design process. He started off by giving them a brief 
with a constraint:  “Reconnect the cable with a guard to protect it.”  They brainstormed to 
diverge into a bigger decision space. He ran them through the selection process. He gave 
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them Velcro, Plexiglas and lock wire to prototype their fix. Finally, the repair was put in 
place. The Petty Officer said he heard several sailors saying, “This is actually kind of 
fun,” about brainstorming and prototyping. Ray Rowland described it like this, “The 
magic is in the prototype. It’s the kindergarten thing. Working and thinking with the 
hands.”  At the time of this writing, the submarine community was planning to implement 
the guard created by the Petty Officer’s division-mates across the fleet.289 
Admiral Richardson has since transferred to take command of Naval Reactors. 
This is an excellent position from which to guard over this fledgling movement for which 
he created the environment necessary to thrive. 
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In this chapter the TANG case study will be analyzed with regard to its 
relationship to the fields of change management and design thinking in order to 
determine how they enable organizational change. This in turn will allow for conclusions 
regarding the organizational dynamics and cultural factors impacting the adoption of 
design thinking techniques within the DoD.   
Additional analysis will be presented beyond that answering the initial research 
questions. The additional analysis is aimed at exploring the relationship between the two 
fields in an effort to establish how they might best be utilized to support one another. For 
use as comparison cases two HBS cases will be referenced:  “Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy & 
Mather Worldwide (A)” and “First National City Bank Operating Group (A).”290  These 
cases will be used along with the TANG case to highlight the differing uses of change 
management and design thinking on organizational change. 
B. DISCUSSION 
1. Change Management 
The TANG case presents an excellent opportunity to create discussion of change 
management. The aspects of creating and managing change can be discussed from the 
perspective of Gleicher’s change formula as modified by Dannemiller and Jacobs, and 
most of Professor Kotter’s work on change including the eight stages of change, and 
some of his eight reasons for resistance to change. 
a. The Change Management Formula 
With the previously discussed change formula being applied to the TANG 
case, the values of dissatisfaction with the status quo, vision of the future, and resistance 
                                                 
290 Nicole Steckler, "Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy and Mather Worldwide (A)." Managing Change. 
Harvard Business School, 1995. 141-159, and John A. Seeger, Jay W. Lorsch and Cyrus F. Gibson. "First 
National City Bank Operating Group (A)." Boston: Harvard Business School, 1974. 
88 
 
to change vary over the course of the case. The value for first steps taken is fixed on the 
other hand. 
The dissatisfaction value differs depending on the perspective it is 
approached from. VADM Richardson, Don Noyes and Josh Smith had each experienced 
dissatisfaction with the current state of technology in the submarine community. Over 
time, the admiral, Josh and Don were able to convince numerous individuals of the 
possibility of improvement through a different change effort, and thus the portion of the 
value for dissatisfaction produced by this group may be viewed as increasing over time.   
On the other hand, the crews and commanders of fleet submarines had 
been dissatisfied with the speed and difficulties involved in previous attempts to 
implement change efforts and could therefore be said to desire the maintenance of the 
status quo. This group has not seen, in the main, the TANG outputs that are being 
incorporated into future APBs with the exception of those who participated in the event 
itself. Their effect on the overall dissatisfaction with current systems across the fleet is 
unknown at this point. The portion of the dissatisfaction value will then be assumed to 
have remained constant. With these two portions comprising the whole of the 
dissatisfaction, the net change is an increase in the organization’s dissatisfaction with the 
current tactical systems.   
The vision for the future was initially laid down by Josh and Don in the 
white paper circulated within APL. When VADM Richardson stated a desire to improve 
the use of the knowledge, experience and capabilities that sailors develop prior to their 
entry into the submarine fleet, this provided the ability for Josh and Don’s vision to move 
forward and become the guide for the development community with respect to the use of 
junior personnel in technological change. With the support of the admiral, Commodore 
Merz and decision makers within APL the strength of the vision was communicated to all 
those impacted. The value therefore is viewed by this researcher as steadily increasing 
over time with the increase in the number of advocates for the vision.   
During the course of TANG, the first steps may be considered the events 
leading up to TANG and the forum itself. Several aspects of those events contributed to 
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the relative value contributed by the first steps toward change. Given the amount of 
thought that went into the selection of participants, the number of people that came to 
believe in the design thinking approach and the use of junior personnel in the forum, the 
positive outcomes of meetings with industry and the usable and relevant nature of the 
outputs of TANG that are currently being implemented into future APBs the results of 
these first steps are viewed as highly successful and of solid value. 
The individuals resistant to change during the events leading up to the 
TANG Forum were largely converted into supporters by the process itself. A few 
interviewees maintained some degree of concern about the impact upon the safety of the 
boat created by the implementations of the new systems. For the most part, their 
perspective was to reserve judgment until it was known how the TANG output systems 
performed during testing. Fleet personnel aboard the boats are largely unaware of the 
systems and their feelings on the matter will likely remain unknown until nearer to the 
implementation of the ideas as part of an APB. Overall, the relative value of the 
resistance to change decreased over time. 
The end result of evaluating TANG against the equation over time was a 
building momentum for the forum. Of course the relative values involved in this equation 
are constantly in flux. If the focus is removed from the vision or if the fleet never 
eventually sees the first step successes, then the forces for change may be overcome by 
the amount of resistance, which never completely goes to zero. Even in this simplistic 
analysis, it is apparent that a change effort needs continuous effort to steward the 
implementation toward the goal. 
b. Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Process 
Kotter’s first stage is establishing a sense of urgency, and this correlates 
well with the change formula’s creating a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo. It 
also includes an aspect of momentum though. TANG does an excellent job of 
highlighting both the previously mentioned dissatisfaction, and the sense of urgency and 
momentum. The submarine community had experienced dissatisfaction with the rate of 
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previous change, but not in a manner that necessarily aided the adoption of this case’s 
new methods for defining the direction of future systems. At every opportunity to press 
the change forward though, Josh and Don engaged with supporters and detractors in an 
effort to broaden the base of support and build momentum. 
The second stage is the creation of a guiding coalition for the change. 
Josh, Commodore Merz and VADM Richardson all worked to build a coalition from their 
differing positions within the hierarchy. In many cases the early adopters required a bit of 
convincing that this change attempt was relevant to the submarine community, but with 
an advocacy born of participation these early adopters served as supporters to those 
creating the change, spread the message to those they encountered, helped to define the 
forum and helped to refine the vision. 
Developing a vision and strategy, the third stage, took place throughout 
the case. Initially there was Josh’s white paper, but it lacked the pull from the submarine 
community to move it forward. Then with the direction from VADM Richardson to 
leverage the knowledge of the junior sailors and JOs, the discussion was opened a larger 
audience. Over time, the vision changed to include design thinking and capitalizing on 
the research and development investments of American industry in the forum. Even the 
name of the event underwent an overhaul in order to better communicate the vision of the 
event. 
As discussed in the case, numerous personnel worked to communicate the 
change vision to the nuclear submarine forces as suggested in Kotter’s stage four. Josh’s 
white paper again factors in at this point to communicate a change vision up the chain of 
command. The Admiral has gone on record on several occasions to emphasize his desire 
the leverage the experience technological experience of junior sailors. Everyone 
interviewed for this research was fully aware of the admiral’s goal of maximizing the use 
of the millennial generation’s innate abilities. While it is never possible to overstate the 
vision for a change, it appears that this vision has been made widely known. 
The process of the design sessions at TANG was stage five:  empowering 
employees for broad-based action. It was shown how the experience created by the 
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TANG team changed the perceptions of the participants from wondering how they could 
hope to be taken seriously to leaving with the knowledge that they had contributed to the 
future of their community. The support and involvement of the admiral and commodore 
served to highlight to the participants that they and their efforts were important to the 
community as a whole. 
The fact that three of the four primary concept outputs of TANG are being 
designed and tested for inclusion in upcoming APBs stands as likely proof of short term 
wins, which is Kotter’s sixth stage. It is still too early to determine the success or failure 
of TANG as an early win, but the level of interest and apparent value of the conceptual 
outputs can be pointed to as such for now.   
Proponents of TANG cannot over emphasize these wins though, and the 
level of effort must be maintained in order to secure future victories. This is the focus of 
stage eight:  consolidating gains and producing more change. There is currently an 
executive version of TANG scheduled for early 2013. If this event is well received and 
leads to more innovations for the fleet, these future wins are what allow the change to 
fully take root in the fabric of the organization. 
Stage eight, anchoring new approaches in the culture, is another stage for 
which it is too early to reach a conclusion. This stage may take several years if it is ever 
reached. It is possible it might take longer than that for the proponents to become aware 
of whether the change ultimately succeeded or not. 
c. Kotter’s Resistance to Change 
The research indicates that the sources of resistance to change include an 
apparent low levels of trust in the proposed change based on previous experience and the 
general fear of the unknown as manifested by the concern for the change’s impact upon 
the boat’s safety. There are several other reasons for resistance that appear to be excluded 
from possibility such as paralyzing bureaucracy based on the multi-level agreement on 
the change from within the hierarchy. Lack of leadership in middle management and lack 
of teamwork also appear to be excluded from the reasons for resistance. The remaining 
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three reasons, inwardly focused cultures, parochial politics and arrogant attitudes, were 
not expressed by anyone as having come from themselves, but there are possible 
undertones of them in the case. There is one underlying trend that recurred in most 
interviews regarding the change resistance. 
The interviewees felt that there was no single person or group upon which 
the blame for resistance could or should be placed. This is directly in line with Senge’s 
point in the literature review that “there is no blame.”291  All involved in the change 
effort, whether designer, contractor or sailor are part of the same system. Each participant 
in the events of and surrounding TANG felt that what they were doing was the best for 
the organization. 
d. Implications of Change Management 
As was expected in the proposal to conduct this thesis research, this case 
served to highlight the vast majority of points relevant to a change management case. 
From this perspective, capturing the details of this case at an early stage should serve to 
further develop the body of cases that may be referenced by future researchers and DoD 
IT leadership to aide in technological change implementations.  
2. Design 
The previous section sought to describe the relationship between TANG 
and change management. In this section the relationship between TANG and design 
thinking will be examined. The TANG case highlights the meaning of design thinking 
through the forum’s focus upon the end user’s experience to solve problems facing the 
boat’s watch team. TANG also points to the value of the inclusion of the end users as 
opposed to relying upon Senge’s “Grand Strategist” to create the desired results for the 
organization. Most importantly, this case may be used to examine all of the previously 
discussed primary focus points of design thinking including empathy, the design process, 
tolerance of failure and organizational morale. 
                                                 
291 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New 
York: Currency Doubleday, 1990. Kindle page 66.  
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Each of the six phases of design thinking as laid out in the Bootcamp 
Bootleg and added to by this researcher is demonstrated in the TANG case. The first five 
phases, the brief, empathize, define, ideate and prototyping, are all discussed in detail in 
the case. This is due to the central nature of the efforts and involvement of a design 
company in the design of the forum and its conduct. Most obvious examples of testing 
the ideas generated and prototyped occur after TANG itself as part of the evaluation and 
implementation of the concepts into follow on APBs, but throughout the prototyping 
phase testing is conducted to evaluate the prototypes and to build on the successes and 
failures of each preceding generation. 
a. Empathy 
The concept of empathy is a central tenet of design thinking. TANG 
exhibits this idea of making an effort to relate to the reality experienced by the user 
through IDEO’s research and the development of their insights into the issues of 
importance to the watch team. Even Josh’s efforts to create a sense of importance for the 
participants can be tied back to empathy. The TANG team, through their empathy with 
junior officers and sailors, worked to create an experience that everyone could enjoy and 
take pride in. 
b. Failure 
The tolerance for failure discussed in design literature is shown in the 
TANG case in the environment of the forum. While the military and the DoD are not 
currently organizations with an exceptional amount of tolerance for failure, the TANG 
team did its utmost to create an environment within the setting of TANG, both during and 
after hours, where the participants felt comfortable putting forward their ideas. These 
ideas were put forth with the expectation that regardless of the face value of the idea, it 




The relationship between design thinking and morale is also to be found in 
the TANG case. Every participant interviewed enjoyed his time working on TANG and 
appears to have carried that enthusiasm with them back to their regular duties. 
Additionally, the TANG team’s efforts to impart a sense of “specialness” to the event 
appears to have motivated the participants to engage in and give their utmost to the 
design sessions. This argument can be substantiated by the potential value of TANG’s 
outputs, the fact that participants were continuing to design after the day’s official events 
were concluded and from the statements of participants upon arrival as compared to their 
statements during and after the forum.   
d. Implications of Design Thinking 
The TANG case provides an excellent source of material for a 
conversation of design thinking and its potential value to the DoD at all levels and 
especially as it pertains to the acquisitions of ever more complicated technological 
systems.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This research sought to determine which organizational dynamics and underlying 
cultural phenomena were involved in the introduction of design thinking to the 
hierarchical bureaucracy of the DoD. Several aspects of the organization came to be 
known as significant to the integration of the participative design thinking effort with 
regards to dynamics and culture.   
1. Organizational Dynamics 
Examining the dynamics against Gleicher’s change formula, there are several 
aspects on both sides of the equation. The resistance side of the organizational dynamic 
appears to be comprised primarily of internal resistance due to three factors. The first 
factor is the prior bad experience fleet commanders had known with the APB process. 
This, in turn, was brought about by the technical difficulties in at least one build and by 
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the difficulties of training crews across differing versions of software and hardware in the 
fleet. The second factor is the probable sense of disconnect among mid level leadership 
due to their lack of inclusion in the initial version of TANG as primary participants. The 
third organizational dynamic that produced resistance was the presence of doubt as to the 
need for a new method of innovation and the suitability of design thinking to serve as that 
method. In particular this new attempt at including the junior sailors and officers was one 
in which they were not familiar with and had no control over. This factor, more than the 
previous two, represents a threat to an individual’s sense of self and their personal 
identity.   
Of the three resistance related organizational dynamics, this represents what is 
possibly the most dangerous threat to the success of the change effort. It is significantly 
easier to logically determine which members of the population might fall into the groups 
impacted by the first two factors. This final factor is capable of including anyone. It is 
also likely that if the individual is not comfortable with his or her place within the 
changing organization, they might be less inclined to discuss their true motivation for any 
actions that might run counter to the change effort. 
Fortunately, there were an even greater number of factors within the organization 
working to push the change effort forward. First and foremost, there was support from all 
levels of the submarine force. Obviously VADM Richardson and Commodore Merz 
supported the change effort. Less obviously, APL leadership supported effort. If Josh 
Smith and Don Noyes had not been given the creative freedom to look outside of the 
organization for new solutions, the design thinking effort could not have gotten off the 
ground.   
Importantly, this support from all levels continued and was reemphasized 
routinely throughout the effort to date. The change effort met with resistance as any 
change would have, but leadership maintained the pressure to leverage the innate abilities 
of junior sailors and officers. Without this, it would have been easy for resistance to point 
to a lack of leadership interest in the program. 
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Not only were sources of resistance countered with a continuous push for the 
change by leadership, but also they were actively engaged in the process in an effort to 
reduce the level of resistance offered. In most cases it appears that the engagement 
created advocates from those who might otherwise have remained resistant to the 
process. The effects may not be permanent for all, but are more positive than the results 
of not engaging at all.   
Another aide to navigating the organizational dynamics of the DoD was the 
presence of an experienced and credible outsider to guide the design sessions. Based 
upon a history of successful design projects and experience with process design in large 
hierarchical organizations, leadership found itself able to place a degree of trust in IDEO. 
This outside assistance is what lent credibility, in the eyes of service members, to the 
concepts involved in design thinking such as saying yes to any idea voiced in a 
brainstorming session.   
The final positive organizational dynamic driving the effort to utilize design 
thinking in the submarine force was the enthusiastic reaction of the majority of the 
personnel that encountered the process. This interaction of the dynamics within the DoD 
organization with the design thinking process created advocates that then went on to push 
the effort further. As seen in the case, very few of those who participated in a design 
thinking session did not embrace the process, and all of those who took part in TANG 
poured their energies into the forum.   
2. Cultural Factors 
Similar to the organizational dynamics, elements within the culture of the 
submarine community work for and against the effort to implement design thinking 
within the organization. On the side of those elements working to constrain the move to 
incorporate deign thinking is the procedurally rigid indoctrination that all officers in the 
organization go through early in their careers. This is by no means meant to portray that 
as other than necessary or positive to the safety of the boat and its sailors, but this nature 
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would tend to argue against the incorporation of new methods of innovation that have not 
been tested in such unforgiving environments previously.   
Another possible cultural element that was examined to determine whether or not 
it was working against the utilization of design thinking was the highly engineering 
centric nature of the organization. Engineering is not anathema to design thinking. When 
working on a product or on certain business processes engineering is an inherent part of 
the design process. In the end, there was no evidence to suggest that this engineering 
focus in any way reduced the effectiveness of the design thinking process or constrained 
its introduction to the organization. It is even likely that the level of engineering 
knowledge and experience of the participants enabled them to better incorporate the 
technologies presented to them at the art of the possible demonstrations provided by 
industry. 
Working to facilitate the inclusion of design thinking were the highly intelligent 
and motivated junior sailors and officers utilized as participants in the forum. These 
participants have training and experience aboard the boats solving dynamically complex 
problems. Giving them design thinking as a tool appears to have served to further enable 
their abilities. Another benefit of utilizing submariners was the empathy that those who 
are currently working with and on the systems in the fleet have for their fellow sailors. 
They share the problems and concerns of the whole population and can surface those 
issues during the design sessions.   
The fact that design thinking has so far been successfully employed within what is 
possibly the most engineering centric and procedurally rigid communities within the DoD 
bodes well for its adoption throughout the whole.   
D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS – CHANGE MANAGEMENT VS DESIGN 
THINKING FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
This case has served to capture a large percentage of the factors involved in both 
change management and design thinking. It has therefore also served to bring to light the 
one glaring difference this researcher sees between the two fields. As stated in the 
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literature review, the area of change management does an excellent job of providing a 
number of frameworks within which to look at the problems that must be overcome in 
order for an organization to successfully implement a change. Change management it 
seems exists at least one level of abstraction above any effort to realistically employ the 
ideas within the field. 
In the First National City Bank case from Harvard, the change proponents appear 
to have followed the guidance from most of Kotter’s stages of change. The one specific 
point at which this researcher feels that case’s success or failure hinged was upon the 
talents of the singular figure of John Reed, the vice president of the group within the bank 
being studied in the case. Reed was single-handedly responsible for the direction of his 
group. He sought the advice and feedback of his guiding coalition, but the ideas were 
largely generated by Reed. 
In the Charlotte Beers case, Beers takes her coalition to a meeting in Vienna. The 
invitation was via a letter to her likely supporters that laid out her plan for the meeting 
and what she expected from them. Once there, she engaged her group in a discussion of 
the issues the company was facing and asked for inputs on the organization’s way 
forward. A few months later, the group produced a list of 22 issues that needed to be 
addressed. This process could be viewed as similar to the brief, research, selection of 
participants and ideation of the design process demonstrated by TANG. 
From that point forward, the two stories, Beers and TANG, appear to part ways 
given the lack of obvious prototyping and testing. On the other hand, the divergence 
offered up in the 22 issues given to her led to the selection of, or convergence to, three 
key strategies. From that point forward, the rest of the case may be viewed as a 
continuous cycle of prototyping the implementation of the strategies, testing and 
gathering feedback from the organization and customers.   
On one further note, the entire process Beers led focused on what value Beer’s 
company could deliver to its customers. The Beers case, it turns out, offers another 
excellent example of design thinking in practical application even if that was not the 
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method of the day. After the experience of investigating, recording and analyzing TANG, 
it appears that this is the critical difference in the two cases.   
Both cases are examples of exceptional managers leading successful changes, but 
Reed at First National was the sole source of change innovation while Beers relied on the 
cumulative power of a de facto design team to create her vision and strategy for success. 
While there is no guarantee of success from any change effort, it appears to this 
researcher that the Beers methodology would have a greater chance of being successfully 
repeated by subsequent organizations.  
The key to creating that repeatability for future change managers is knowledge of 
both change management and design thinking. Change management provides a means to 
understanding the problem, but it is design thinking that provides a practical solution to 
harness the experience and insights of a larger group in the creation of a change 
management plan. This involvement in the creation in turn furthers their involvement and 
emotional connection to the success of the project. 
The practical and readily applicable nature of design thinking can be seen in the 
story of the Petty Officer utilizing the design process while underway aboard his boat and 
the numerous participants and SMEs who continue to use design thinking in their daily 
work functions. Design thinking can be applied to any problem regardless of the scale. 
This requires some effort to ensure that the problem is viewed from the correct 
perspective so as to not limit the discovery or to be too broad as to diminish the focus, but 
it can be done. Design can be used at each stage of the more abstract change process to 
create practical solutions leveraging the talents of the many. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The events leading up to TANG and during the forum serve as excellent examples 
of the important teaching points of a change management case. Similarly, the elements of 
design thinking are also present in the case, and should be included in any effort to 
discuss change management as a valid, relevant and dynamic tool to create lasting change 
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at each of Kotter’s eight stages. While change management exists at a remove of one 
level of abstraction, design thinking can serve as the bridge to implementation. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research effort was to record the events surrounding the 
TANG Forum held by the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine community. Additionally, the 
material was analyzed for its fit within the fields of change management and design 
thinking in an effort to determine if this case brought forth any overlap or differentiation 
of the two fields. During the course of the research numerous potential areas for further 
research or possible incorporation into other areas of the DoD were observed. 
Based on the readings, interviews and analysis, design thinking is an excellent fit 
for the DoD. Given its fractal nature, it can be used at all levels of the organization to 
examine dynamically and detail complex problems in order to create valid solutions 
based on the knowledge and experience of those most involved – the end users. This case 
does an excellent job of highlighting how design thinking can be best implemented and 
how it serves to remove the level of abstraction present in change management. 
Based upon the previous review of the literature and this analysis, change 
management appears to indicate that change must be driven from the top of an 
organization. Following this model, leadership is most likely the initiator of change via 
an issued command and is certainly necessary to support change, especially if the change 
is significant. On the other hand, the design literature proposes a different model and 
suggested that innovation not only can be highly participative, but also needs to involve 
several diverse voices in order to be successful.   
This case study demonstrates that these two paradigms – the paradigm of change 
management and the paradigm of design thinking – are not contradictory or exclusive, 
that in fact major change can involve both the design high-involvement process and top 
down driven change. More importantly, in terms of the field of organizational theory this 
case suggests that high-participation change can occur in the context of a highly 
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bureaucratic structure. Commitment to bureaucracy and the chain of command does not 
drive out bottom-up change processes. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Research 
Four key opportunities for further research were noted over the course of this 
investigation. First, there was a widespread feeling of distrust within the fleet regarding 
new technological changes that had been brought onto the boats in the fleet. None of the 
concept outputs of TANG have arrived in the fleet yet, but word of the forum has likely 
filtered across the boats by now given the participation of VADM Richardson and 
Commodore Merz. It could be of value to future change efforts to analyze the 
relationship between the support of leadership and the positive reaction of TANG 
participants to the opinions of members of the fleet in both leadership and user roles. 
Specifically, are current members of the fleet more or less likely to embrace a change 
created through the design thinking process versus the more conventional methods of 
development? 
Second, it is recommended that someone attend and develop a case study of the 
TANG to be held in February of 2013. This could be of benefit since the researcher 
would be able to capture the majority of the event live to better detail the case. It would 
also serve to evaluate whether the design thinking initiative now at work in the submarine 
community has possibly gained another small win along its path to becoming part of the 
fabric of the organization. A third value could be had in the comparison of the outputs of 
the two forums. Does one version of the forum, junior personnel or senior personnel, 
provide more technological intuition to the process?  Does this confirm or disconfirm the 
notion of millennials as being more ready to adapt to new technological initiatives? 
Third, if design thinking were to be implemented by a group within DoD, the 
individuals within the group would of necessity work to empathize with members of 
other sub-cultures within the DoD. To facilitate this interaction, and possibly guide the 
insights of the design team, it would be beneficial to conduct ethnographic research into 
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the many expected sub-cultures of the DoD. Without this type of research, it is too likely 
that the design team members would be guided by their personal biases of other cultures. 
It is possible that none of the sub-cultures is all that different from any other, but each 
sub-organization within the whole of DoD indoctrinates its members to believe 
themselves separate from the rest. Ethnographic research would not be objective by its 
nature, but it would provide an outsider’s perspective on the topic. 
Finally, every large-scale acquisition program and change effort should be 
chronicled for use by later researchers. As stated, there is little documented material on 
the largest IT investment in the DoD’s history, NMCI. There is less recorded material on 
smaller initiatives. Most of the knowledge is relayed through stories from one individual 
to another. Given the rate of failure of IT projects within the DoD, these lessons learned 
need to be captured and disseminated more widely. 
2. Acquisitions 
In today’s fiscally constrained environment, it was highly probable that there 
would be several recommendations regarding the acquisitions of information technology 
within DoD. There are five recommendations concerning acquisitions, but each of these 
recommendations may be viewed as having a research component as well. Each of these 
acquisitions related recommendations should, if implemented, be seen to have a 
requirement to have case study research conducted during its implementation in order to 
chronicle the fit of the change to the organization. This would not only serve future 
researchers, but current decision makers as they lead the changes. 
None of the components of design thinking is in opposition to the current rules for 
acquisitions. The process helps to define requirements that are never fully understood, but 
could always be better understood. The prototyping and testing phases could also 
contribute to the avoidance of expensive failures at later stages. It costs more to 
thoroughly design a product up front, but as shown those costs are more than offset by 
the cost of late stage rework on a project or program. 
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First, efforts should be made to include design thinking in other areas of the DoD. 
As systems become more complex the presence and involvement of current users, as 
opposed to user representatives, could help define the requirements of new systems or be 
used to refine legacy systems. This should be done in order to establish the fit of design 
thinking to the DoD. It should not however be done on a single acquisitions program that 
may fail or succeed without regard to the contribution of design thinking. If design 
thinking were implemented on several programs, its value could be measured objectively 
in the aggregate or subjectively through interviews and case study. 
Second, the DoD should seek to promote the involvement of industry leading 
companies in these design sessions for smaller scale items. Corporate America has 
proven itself to be willing to participate in the future of the DoD; their participation 
supports the availability of the markets they depend upon for their goods and this 
researcher believes that most Silicon Valley companies are currently demonstrating a 
desire to help the nation. Their research and development dollars could serve to improve 
the art of the possible for DoD. Additionally, the expected value of DoD purchases in 
these smaller count systems means that they have no expectation of real financial gain or 
reimbursement. The DoD is no longer the primary source of innovation. We need to be 
the fast followers of other’s innovation. Therefore, there is no conflict between their 
participation and acquisition rules. 
Third and related to the previous recommendation, this researcher has 
increasingly felt that design and modern methods of software engineering such as spiral 
and agile development have much in common with design thinking. This relationship, if 
any, should be explored in order to maximize the benefits of both the development 
methods and design thinking as the percentage of functions performed by software 
continues to rise dramatically and approaches 100 percent. There already exists some 
discussion on the relationship of the two topics, but this researcher has seen nothing to 
indicate its application to DoD or federal acquisition programs. 
Fourth, as mentioned in the ethnographic research recommendation, the creation 
of a design thinking team internal to DoD could serve to guide major acquisition 
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programs and to possibly advise on programs that are struggling to meet requirements. 
This design team should be created after an investigation of the relationship between 
what a design team could do for acquisitions as compared to the more common Integrated 
Project Team approach. Additionally, a good source for initial members of the team 
would be those who had previously been involved in TANG either as participants or 
SMEs.   
The final acquisitions related recommendation concerns prototyping. As a 
minimum, the low cost, low risk version of prototyping espoused in design thinking 
literature should be adopted in acquisitions programs. Contractors obviously create 
prototypes of components and systems that are then tested by designated test groups and 
user representatives. Instead, the end users should be involved in the creation of these 
cheap prototypes and their testing in order to avoid the increased cost of prototypes that 
are overinvested in that in turn leads to later stage adjustments and higher costs. 
3. Education 
Several opportunities to increase awareness of the benefits of design thinking 
became obvious during this research. The implementation of design thinking is similar to 
the implementation of any other organizational change. It must be worked into the fabric 
of the organization over time. One of the earliest and most impactful opportunities is 
during attendance at DoD educational institutions.   
At a minimum each management curriculum offered within the DoD should have 
a design course introducing the concepts. To support the concepts, a design thinking 
simulation could be conducted similar to the one provided during a change management 
class at NPS by IDEO. 
Similarly, most simulations aimed at preparing students for the issues they will be 
faced with in their future leadership roles are designed around a contentious premise. As 
examples, the ORGsimONE from Trigon, a German development consultancy, does an 
excellent job of demonstrating the internal friction and resistance to change within an 
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organization.292  The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of 
Management created the “Beer Game” which is similar in nature.293  Both of these 
simulations create the tension of disparate organizations or units within an organization 
as they attempt to balance the optimization of the unit against the optimization of the 
whole. A simulation designed around design thinking, as mentioned, already exists. One 
with a military centric focus could serve to focus the participants in the same way that 
many students find a military change case study more relatable than the corporate 
equivalent. 
Finally, it is recommended that a teaching case study of the style used in support 
of the case method at Harvard Business School be created from the information compiled 
within this case study. The educational case studies discussed in the analysis chapter of 
this thesis were incredible tools for gaining insight on the part of the students in change 
management courses. Unfortunately, few educational case studies exist with a military 
focus. Many students have stated that this hampered their ability to relate to the situations 
discussed. The creation of an educational case study based upon TANG should better 
allow students to internalize the lessons to be learned from the case and supporting 
materials for change management and design thinking. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This case has served to record the events of the TANG Forum for posterity and to 
build a basis for the comparison of change management theory and the field of design 
thinking. As with any change, TANG was faced with opposition and resistance. Through 
the application of change management and design thinking principles, the TANG team 
was able to, as of the writing of this thesis, apply enough pressure to overcome the 
opposing force of resistance to change.   
                                                 
292 Trigon, ORGsimONE Business Simulation Game. 2012. 
http://www.trigon.at/en/_trigonSpecials/planspiele/beratungsangebot/orgsimone.php?sub1=17&sub2=131 
(accessed October 5, 2012). 
293 Peter Dizikes, The Secrets of the System. May 2, 2012. 
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/manufacturing-beer-game-0503.html (accessed October 28, 2012). 
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The primary take away of this research is that design thinking is an acceptable and 
effective tool for bringing the more abstract guidance of change management into 
practical application for an organization. It appears that the design thinking process may 
be used at any level of an organization to approach any problem, but the process’s full 
potential requires much more investigation and experimentation. 
Some new approach is required to create the lasting change in the manner in 
which DoD acquires new technology. Given the growing percentage of IT in every 
investment DoD makes, and the historical failure rate of IT investments, it only makes 
sense that something else capable of combining the current acquisition system, 
component reuse and architecture be examined. These are the keys to stewardship of 
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APPENDIX E: IDEO’S POTENTIAL SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
------SME INTERVIEW GUIDE------ 
 
 
1. Intro--quick bio 
 
2. About us... 
 
3. About our project: We are helping APL plan and conduct a workshop 
to drive innovation around technology and communication on the 
subs. We are focusing on human needs as a primary inspiration 
point. 
 
Do you have any thoughts on this? 
 
 









5. What keeps you up at night? Any ideas about how you would like to 
see that addressed? 
 
 
6. What do you think is most frustrating to the guys on the subs? 
 
 
7. Where do you see shipboard operations and technology going in the 
next 5 years?  
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APPENDIX F: IDEO’S WATERFRONT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Waterfront Interview Guide       
 
1. Intro--quick bio: Please tell us a little about yourself. 




2. A bit about IDEO… 
 
3. About our project: We are helping plan and conduct a workshop to drive 
innovation around technology and communication on the subs. We are 
focusing on human needs as a primary inspiration point. 
 
[Any thoughts on this?] 
 
4. What attracted you to submarines? 
 
5. What do you like about being on a sub? (look for stories) 
 
6. What do you find frustrating? (look for stories) 
 
7. What is going well that you think new development should build on? 
- Technology 
- Human Systems/processes 
- Other 
 
8. If you could change anything, what would you change? 
- Hardware 
- Software 




9. What do you find yourself asking for from others? 
 






11. What keeps you up at night? Any ideas about how you would like to see 
that addressed? 
 
12. What are the differences between operating in a training module and 
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operations at sea? 
 
13. How can sub systems support continuous improvement of human 
performance? 
 
14. Where do you see shipboard operations and technology going in the next 
5 years?  
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